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ABSTRACT 
Having a comprehensive model of security requirements is a crucial step towards 
developing a reliable software system. An effective model of security requirements which 
describes the possible scenarios that may affect the security aspects of the system under 
development can be an effective approach for subsequent use in generating security test 
cases. 
Misuse case was first proposed by Sinder and Opdahl as an approach to extract the 
security requirements of the system under development [1]. A misuse case is a use case 
representing scenarios that might be followed by a system adversary in order to 
compromise the system; that is a behavior that should not happen in a system. 
As an effective approach used to model potential threats to the system under 
development, misuse cases are an effective approach for suggesting mitigation 
mechanisms. A mitigation use case is a use case that represents the countermeasure 
requirements of a misuse case. 
By describing the security threats that may be exploited from the adversary’s point 
of view, a misuse case provides an effective basis for security testing that addresses the 
interactions between the adversary and the system under development. Security testing also 
needs to verify the security mechanisms of the system against misuse cases. Thus, by 
representing the security requirements of the system, mitigation use cases can also be a 
good basis for security testing. 
vii 
Misuse cases and mitigation use cases are ordinarily described in natural language. 
Unfortunately, this approach has difficulties and limits the ability to generate security test 
cases from the misuse cases and mitigation use cases. This thesis presents a new, structured 
approach to generating security test cases based on the extracted security test model from 
the textual description of the misuse cases accompanying mitigation use cases, represented 
as a Predicate/Transition (PrT) net. 
This approach will enable the system developers to model the misuse cases 
accompanying mitigation use cases and then generating security test cases based on the 
resulting security test models, ensuring that the potential attacks are mitigated 
appropriately in the software development process. 
This approach has been applied to two real-world applications, FileZilla Server, a 
popular FTP server [19] in C++ and a Grant Proposal Management System (GPMS) in 
Java. Experiment results show that the generated security test cases are efficient test cases 
that can reveal many security vulnerabilities during the development of GPMS and can kill 
the majority of the FileZilla Server mutants with seeded vulnerabilities.
viii 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Software security testing is one of the most important steps in developing a secure 
software system. It seeks to validate and verify that a software system meets the system’s 
security goals and requirements. An effective security testing process addresses 
undiscovered security vulnerabilities and design flaws by using different attack scenarios. 
Early consideration and addressing of software security requirements, instead of 
postponing discovery until the final stages of development, is a crucial step to yield a secure 
software system. It allows the system developers to envisage the threats posed to the 
software system and the countermeasures to the threats. The importance of addressing 
software security in the early stages of the development lifecycle is now widely 
acknowledged [2]. Different research studies show that, for most cases, vulnerabilities in 
the software security are caused by flaws in design and implementation of the software [3]. 
Therefore, addressing and examining the potential security threats in the early phases of 
the software development process enables system developers to ensure the security level 
of the system design and investigate alternatives which may be implemented to meet the 
security goals of a software system. 
Misuse case modeling is an efficient method of eliciting security requirements [4]. 
The idea is to define potential security threats to the system under development by creating 
a negative use case from the system adversary point of view and define mitigation use cases 
that can mitigate the security threats. Misuse case modeling inherits many characteristics 
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of the use case modeling. For instance, using natural language to present misuse cases 
allows stakeholders with a non-technical background to be involved in the security 
requirements process. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The textual description of misuse cases demonstrates the potential threats to the 
system under development. The textual description of mitigation use cases presents the 
security requirements that should be implemented to ensure that the system is resistant to 
those misuse cases.  
One of the major difficulties in security testing is in identifying or targeting the 
presence of system adversaries. Misuse cases can be an effective basis for security testing 
as they establish the presence of an adversary by describing the malicious scenarios that 
the adversary may follow to compromise the system. Another significant issue in security 
testing is the lack of a systematic approach in selecting and validating security test cases to 
ensure the security of the system. Mitigation use cases can be a good source of security 
testing as they describe the security requirements. 
Misuse cases and mitigation use cases are commonly described in natural language; 
such an approach offers many practical advantages. They are easy to describe and 
understand. However, misuse cases and mitigation use cases are not directly amenable to 
security testing and formal analysis. 
This thesis presents a new structured approach for extracting security test models 
from the textual description of misuse cases and mitigation use cases. Security test models, 
as represented by Predicated/Transition nets, are used to generate security test cases by the 
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MISTA tool. Two case studies are employed to demonstrate the feasibility of the presented 
approach and the effectiveness of the generated security test cases. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to develop a new systematic approach for 
extracting security test models from the textual descriptions of misuse cases and mitigation 
use cases. It will enable the misuse cases and mitigation use cases to be used directly in the 
security testing process. 
Eliminating redundancy in security test cases represents another objective of this 
work. By improving the quality of the generated security test cases, this approach provides 
two new techniques to combine the resulted security test models. The first technique, based 
on STRIDE, combines resulting security test models that have the same STRIDE 
category(s) into one security test model. The second technique, based on Use Case, 
combines all security test models related to a specific use case into one security test model. 
Having the ability to automatically generate executable security test cases from the 
generated security test model represents another objective. During this research work, the 
MISTA tool was chosen to automatically generate security test cases from the security test 
models. The MISTA tool generates test cases in various programming languages and 
provides test generators for comprehensive coverage criteria of test models, including 







1.4 Thesis Organization 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follow. Chapter 2 reviews related work. 
Chapter 3 presents the proposed approach. Chapter 4 describes the FileZilla server case 
study. Chapter 5 discusses the GPMS case study. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO RELATED WORK 
Misuse cases were first proposed by Sinder and Opdahl [1] as a way to elicit 
security requirements by addressing the potential threats to the system under design and 
producing additional functionalities to mitigate those threats. The first practical using of a 
misuse case was done by Alexander [6] in a design workshop that addresses the security 
and safety issues, the conclusion from this work was that misuse cases are an intuitive 
approach of discussing and addressing the trade-offs between different design approaches. 
Different research works have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of misuse cases as 
an approach in addressing, extracting, and documenting the system security requirements, 
Meaher [7] applied the misuse cases techniques in an industrial setting, the researcher setup 
a design workshop and he explained the concept of the misuse cases to the participants and 
asked them to find security threads and model them by using the misuse cases textual 
descriptions and diagram. The conclusions from this work were, the misuse cases technique 
are promising technique in extracting the system threats and the mitigations mechanisms 
and also misuse case are easy to understand and improved the participant security 
awareness. 
Guttorm et al. [8] have described that the misuse case modeling approach has been 
used by many of EU-funded project. The research reported that the technique and notation 
were helpful in the process of eliciting security requirements and easy to understand. 
Breivik GF [9] have reported that the misuse case modeling has been used to represent the 
OWASP security threats. The misuse cases have been defined in pattern form and validated 
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by interviewing with different stakeholders. The knowledge gained from the project 
confirms the lenience of understanding misuse cases and their notations. I. A. Tøndel et 
al., [10] suggested an approach of combining the attack trees and misuse cases for 
extracting security requirements and threat modeling in the requirement phase of the 
software projects and also they proposed to create UML activity diagram that represents 
the security use cases details to improve the security awareness in the developments teams, 
this approach need more validations by doing more experiments in order to verify the 
usefulness for the development team members and other improvements. 
Different research works extend the misuse cases technique by extending the 
methodology of misuse cases and the notations of misuse cases, J. J. Pauli and D. Xu [11] 
presented an approach to the architectural design and analysis of secure software systems 
based on the extracted system requirements in the form of use cases and misuse cases. 
Saleh and Habil [12] proposed a new security requirements behavior model (SRBM) for 
obtaining trustworthiness web application and web services, they extend the generic 
template of misuse cases that proposed by Sinder and security use cases by Firesmith and 
the operational model to be more flexible and adaptable to the changes of web services and 
web application requirements. Røstad [13] proposed some extensions to the misuse case 
diagram by adding extra notations to distinguish between inside and outside attackers. 
Dimitrakos et al. [14] introduced other notations such as icons, coins of assets and stacks 
and others to recognize different types of threats. They also incorporate misuse cases with 
different UML diagrams and conducted different experiments to test this approach in e-
Business projects such as Skipense. McDermott and Fox [15] developed an abuse case 
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model by adopting object-oriented modeling approach and use cases to capture and analyze 
security requirements. 
Different misuse case models have been used to design secure software systems, 
UML Misuse Deployment Diagram has been used to model the potential attacks and design 
mitigation approaches that should be implemented in order to prevent attacks in the early 
stages of the software development process. J. Whittle et al. [16] introduce a new approach 
for modeling and executing misuse cases scenarios by using an extended interaction 
overview diagram (EIODs), this research work, integrates executable modeling of 
scenarios and weaving the aspect scenarios, the resulted model allows the stockholders to 
brainstorm the potential security threats and capture the mitigation mechanisms. This 
approach required a lot of work and need a technical specialist to follow it. 
Threat modeling has proven an efficient source of security testing as the threat 
models able to describe software security threats. Xu et al. [23] presented a new approach 
to automate security testing by using threat models. In their research work, threat models 
were built in the fashion which follows: a) identify the software system functionalities and 
security goals; b) identify security threats for each identified functionality in systematic 
manner by using STRIDE classification [5]; and c) create security threat net represented in 
Predicate/Transition net for each identified threat. In order to automatically generate 
security test cases from the created threat nets, the MISTA (previously called ISTA) tool 
generates test cases based on TMID specification. TMID specification contains a threat 
model that is represented in PrT net and Model Implementation Mapping (MIM). In this 
research work, two case studies have been conducted, FileZilla FTP server and Magento, 
web-based online shopping [28]. In both case studies, mutants have been created, and the 
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security test cases have been executed against them. The results of this research work 
indicate that the generated security test cases were efficient in killing the majority of the 
mutants in both case studies. However, this research does not discuss how to create threat 




CHAPTER THREE THE APPROACH 
As shown in Figure 1, the approach consists of three steps: (1) conduct misuse case 
modeling, (2) create security test model, and (3) generate security test cases from the 
security test model by using The MISTA tool. In the following, we elaborate on each of 
them. 
 
Figure 1: The Approach 
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3.1 Misuse Case Modeling 
Misuse case modeling is the first step in our approach. It describes security attacks 
against use cases as well as the security features needed to mitigate them.  
 3.1.1 Defining Use Cases 
Use cases describe the functional requirements of the system under development. 
Use case modeling is a structured approach to addressing the interactions between a system 
and its actors. In this research, the following steps are used to define use cases: 
 Define use case actors, their desired system functions, and interactions between 
actors and system functions according to system documentation, interviews with 
the system stockholders, and user experiences.  
 Create a use case diagram which depicts the actors, use cases, and interactions.  
 Create use case textual description.  
Figure 2 provides a sample use case diagram that consists of “Create New Proposal 
Document”, “Submit a Proposal by PI”, “Save Proposal”, and “Notify Users” use cases. 
The arrows between the actor and the use cases represent the relationship between the use 
cases and the actor. An “include” relationship is signified by using an arrow that is labeled 
“include”. The extend relationship is represented by an arrow labeled “extend”.  
 
Figure 2 : A Sample Use Case Diagram  
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Table 1 shows the template of use cases used in this thesis. Generally, the 
description of a use case consists of; use case ID, name, actor, goal, precondition, post-
condition, extension points, alternative flow, exception flow, and recovery flow that 
describe the system requirement, goals and the interaction between the actor and system. 
The extension points field is used to represent the extend relation with other use cases and 
an underlined step in the main flow is used to indicate to the reader the “include” 
relationship of other use cases. Table 2 shows a sample use case description. 
Table 1. Use Case Template. 
Use case # 
Represents the use case number, that can be used for 
tracing the use cases. 
Use case name Represents the name of the use case.  
Actor 
Represents the actors of the use cases, by listing all the 
stakeholders that will use the use case.  
Goal Represents the target of the use case. 
Preconditions 
Represents the conditions that the system should ensure to 
be true before starting the use case 
Main Flow 
Represents a sequence of steps that describe how the use 
case goal can be achieved. Main flow represents the interactions 
between the actors and the system feature.   
Post-Condition 




In some cases, a use case may extend other use cases whose 
details described in other use case description. 
Alternative flow 
Represents a set of alternative steps that can be performed 
instead of one or more step in the main flow.  
Exception flow 
Represents a set of conditional steps that are a response to 
the exceptions in one or more step in the main flow that prevent the 
use case from achieving its goal. 
Recovery flow 
Represents a set of conditional steps that response to a 
failure at one or more step in the main flow and how the system 






Table 2: Description of Use Case “Submit a Proposal by PI” 
Use case # UC-3 
Use case name Submit a proposal by principal investigator (PI). 
Actor Principal Investigator (PI).  
Goal To submit the proposal by PI. 
Preconditions 
1. The PI created the proposal and signed it. 
2. The Co-PI(s) signed the proposal. 
3. The proposal status not submitted. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to account. 
2. The actor selects “My proposals” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting the edit proposal 
action.  
4. The system opens the proposal in edit mode. 
5. The actor signs the proposal. 
6. The actor selects the submit action. 
7. The system sends a notification to the department chair, PI, Co-
PI(s) and Senior Personnel. 
8. The system records the request in the user audit log. 
Post-Condition 
1. The proposal status changed to waiting for chair approval. 
2. The actor has read access to the proposal. 
Extension Points 1. Step 7, extends Notify users use case. 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the research engine                                                
 2.a.1 The actor inserts the proposal information in the 
search fields.   
 2.a.2 The system returns the search result. 
 2.a3 The actor selects the proposal. The use case 
continuous at The actor selects the submit action in MF 
Exception flow 
4.a CO-PI(s) not signed the proposal 
 4.a.1 The system shows an error message that CO-PIs are 
not signed on the proposal. 
Recovery flow None. 
 
3.1.2 Defining Misuse Cases 
A misuse case represents a potential security threat against some of the use cases. 
Misuse case is the inverse of a use case, and the actor of the misuse case is the inverse of 
the use case actors (i.e., adversary). We define misuse cases as follows; 
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 Define the misuse case actors, what potential security threats they represent, and 
the interaction between the actors (i.e., Adversaries) and the system functions in 
structured and systematic manner. This is done by applying all potential STRIDE 
threats (spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, 
denial of service, and elevation of privilege) and security goals (Authentication, 
Authorization, Confidentiality, Integrity, Accountability, Availability, Non-
repudiation) to each step in the main flow and alternative flow of use cases. 
 Extend the use case diagram to include the misuse cases. Use case/misuse case 
diagram depicts the misuse cases and threaten use cases. 
 Create a textual description for each misuse case. 
Figure 3 is a sample use case/misuse case diagram that consists of the use cases 
denoted by blue ovals, and the actor in the regular use case diagram (see Fig.2). The 
diagram also shows the threat in terms of misuse-actor and misuse case. The misuse actor 
and misuse case are colored with inverted colors like black or gray colors to distinguish 
them from the use cases and the use case actors. Additionally, “threaten” is the relationship 
between the use case and misuse case. Each use case may be threatened by several misuse 
cases and each misuse case may threaten many use cases.  
 
Figure 3: Use Case/Misuse Case Diagram. 
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Table 3 shows the template for misuse case textual description used in this thesis. 
Similar to the use case description, misuse case description has; misuse case ID, name, 
goals, actor, preconditions, post-conditions, and main flow fields that describe in detail 
what the adversary might try to do. The differences in misuse case description from the use 
case description are: misuse case category field is used to classify the misuse case category 
according to STRIDE classification, a threat point field that lists the use cases threatened 
by the misuse case, and mitigation filed representing the mitigation use case that can 
mitigate the misuse case. Table 4 shows an example of misuse case textual description. 
Table 3: Misuse Case Template 
Misuse case # 
Represents the misuse case number. This field used 
for tracing and organizing the misuse cases. 
Misuse case name Represents the misuse case name. 
Misuse case category Represents misuse case STRIDE classification  
Goal Represents the goal of misuse case  
Actor 
Represents the actors of the misuse cases, by listing 
the possible adversaries.  
Preconditions 
Represents the conditions that should be true before 
performing the attack. For example, having username and 
password of a system user 
Main Flow 
Represents a sequence steps that demonstrate the 
scenario of the attack. 
Post-conditions 
Represents the states of the system after performing 
the misuse case. 
Threat point 
Maps each misuse case to any use case that threaten 
by  
Mitigation 
Map the misuse case to any mitigation use case that 
mitigated by. 
 
Table 4: Description of “URL Redirect” Misuse Case 
Misuse case # MUC-1 
Misuse case name URL Redirect Attack. 
Misuse case category 
Information disclosure, DoS and elevation of 
privilege.  





1. The actor has an account on the system or has other user 
login information. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor selects a proposal and opens it by select edit 
action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or 
disapprove proposal actions. 
Post-conditions 1. The system will redirect the user to the malicious site. 
Threat point 
1. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 
3, The actor sign the proposal.  
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by IRM, Main flow, step 
3, The actor sign the proposal.  
Mitigation Cross-site Scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
3.1.3 Defining Mitigation Use Cases 
 Mitigation use cases represent the countermeasure requirements of the misuse cases. 
In order to define the proper mitigation use case for each misuse case identified, the 
following steps have been applied; 
 Define the mitigation use cases by applying STRIDE and the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) [18] to each misuse case. STRIDE and 
OWASP were used as they represent both the application threats and the proper 
countermeasures. 
 Extend use case/misuse case diagram to include the mitigation use cases. 
 Create a mitigation use case textual description. 
Figure 4 is a sample use case/misuse case/mitigation use case diagram. This 
diagram consists of the use cases, misuse cases, and mitigation use cases. “Include” is the 
relationship between use case and mitigation use case and “mitigate” is the relation 
between misuse case and mitigation use case. In Figure 4, the mitigation use case (i.e. 
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Cross-Site Scripting Mitigation) is colored green to distinguish it from the use cases, and 
misuse cases. An “include” relation is used to connect the use cases (i.e., Create New 
Proposal Document, Submit Proposal) with mitigation use case, and the “mitigate” relation 
used to connect the misuse case (i.e., URL Redirection Attack) and mitigation use case. 
 
Figure 4: Use Case/Misuse Case/Mitigation Use Case Diagram 
Table 5 provides the template of mitigation use cases used in this thesis. Similar to 
the use case and misuse case description, a mitigation use case description has: mitigation 
use case ID, name, goal, precondition, and post-condition fields. The differences between 
the mitigation use case description and use case description are: (1) the priority field that 
represents the importance of having the mitigation use case and, (2) the exclusion of an 
actor field. Table 6 shows a sample mitigation use case textual description.  
Table 5: Mitigation Use Case Template 
Mitigation use case # 
Represents the mitigation use case number. This 
field used for tracking and organizing the mitigation use 
cases. 
Mitigation use case 
name 




Represents the goal that should be achieved from 
the mitigation use case. 
Precondition 
Represents the conditions that initiate the mitigation 
use case. 
Main Flow 
Represents a sequence of steps that describe the 
security requirement implementation. 
Post Condition 
Represent the system states after executing the 
mitigation use case  
Priority Represent the priority of mitigation use. 
 
Table 6: Description of “Cross-Site Scripting” Mitigation Use Case 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 1. 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
Goal To prevent the XSS attack. 
Precondition 
1. The actor injects malicious script code. 
2. The actor uploads malicious script code.  
Main Flow 
1. Validate user input by using whitelist technique. 
2. Use Output Escaping technique to ensure any JavaScript 
code is converted to safe display. 
3. Use HTML escape JSON values and decode the JSON 
values and safely parse it. 
Post Condition 
1. The XSS attack malicious code will not be executed. 
2. The application will render the web pages safely and 
appropriately. 
3. The application protects the user data.  
Priority High. 
 
3.2 Extract Security Test Model 
A security test model is represented as a Predicate/Transition (PrT) net in the 
MISTA tool. A PrT net is a 7-tuple <P, T, R, L, Ʃ, ϭ, M0>, where, 
1. P is a set of places (circles) that represent a state or condition. 
2. T is a set of transitions (rectangles) that represent functions or events. 
3. R is a set of normal arcs, representing a relationship between a place and a 
transition. 
4. L is a labeling function on arc R. each label is a tuple of variables or constant in Ʃ.  
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5. Ʃ is a set of constants and relations (e.g. arithmetic relation). 
6. Ϭ is a guard function on T. 
7. M0 is initial marking, where, M0 (P) is the set of tokens in predicate P, and each 
token is a tuple in Ʃ. 
3.2.1 Transforming Misuse Case Textual Description into PrT Net 
We extract PrT net based on the main flow of a misuse case which depicts a 
sequence of steps to be followed by the adversary to compromise the system. Misuse case 
main flow description includes different types of steps that represent an attack on the 
system. For example, a Repetitive step represents a reiteration of an attack, for instance, 
one in which new user accounts are created automatically. In this research, four types of 
steps have been defined; Simple step, Repetitive step, Conditional step, and Concurrent 
step. The representation of those steps in PrT net is discussed in the following sections. 
3.2.1.1 Mapping a Simple Step into PrT Constructs 
Simple Step represents executing a simple operation in the system environment by 
the actor. One example would be; select login action or submit proposal action. This step 
can be represented in PrT net as follow: 
1. Define one transition “t” that represents the Simple Step. 
2. Define input place P-IN and output place P-OUT. 
3. Use input arc R-IN to connect the input place P-IN with transition “t” and output 
arc R-OUT to connect the transition “t” with output place. 
4. Use arc label to define the input parameters by labeling the R-IN arc, and use R-
OUT label to define the output parameters if exist. 
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In Table 7, the first step in the main flow is an example of a Simple Step. Figure 5 
shows the representation of a Simple step by the first step in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Automatically Register User Account Misuse Case Description 
Misuse case # MUC-1 
Misuse case name Automatic register user accounts 
Misuse case 
category 
Denial of service attack (DoS). 
Goal 
To automatically create malicious user accounts and/or 
crash the service.  
Actor System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor access to the system main page. 
2. The actor automatically and repeatedly does: 
2.1 The actor selects the SingUp page link. 
2.2 The actor fills the required fields. 
2.3 The actor selects SignUp action. 
Post-conditions 
1. Create malicious users accounts. 
2. The signup process will be suspended or crashed. 
Threat point 
1. Create user account, Main flow, Step 4, The system receives the 
signup request.  
Mitigation Honey Token Form component mitigation use case 
 
 
Figure 5: Simple Step Mapping Example 
3.2.1.2 Mapping a Repetitive Step into PrT Constructs 
The Repetitive step represents a repetitive action executed by the actor on the 
system environment. In distinguishing repetitive step from other steps, a keyword such as 
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a repeat, iterate, loop, and other keywords demonstrate that the step is repetitive. In misuse 
case or use case textual descriptions, a Repetitive step has sub-steps which represent the 
repetitive blocks as shown in Table 7 above. Step 2 represents an example of a repetitive 
step and the sub-steps 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are the repetitive block. Repetitive steps can be 
mapped to PrT constructs as follow: 
1. Define a transition “t(i)” for each repeatable block. For example, in step 2 we have 
3 sub-steps (repeatable blocks), so we create 3 transition “t(i)” (e.g. i = 1,2, 3…., 
n). 
2. Define input place P-IN for each transition “t(i)”. For step 2 in the table, we create 
3 P-IN places.  
3. Connect each input place P-IN with transition “t(i)” by using input arc. 
4. Connect transition “t(i)” with P-IN(i+1) by using output arc. For example, connect 
the transition of first repeated block with input place of the second transition. 
5. Connect the last transition “t(n)” with first input place “P-IN (i=1)” by using output 
arc. For example, connect the transition of sub-step 3 with input place of the first 
transition. 
6. Define the guard condition that control the loop in the last transition “t(n)”. The 
guard condition can be explicitly or implicitly defined in the repetitive step. The 
guard condition will have two variables, the first variable (e.g. X) represent the 
number of iterations and other variable (e.g. Y) used to update the loop control 
value. 
7. Use Arc label to pass the loop control variables between transitions. The Arc label 
between the last transition and first transition will hold the second variables where 
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other Arc labels will hold the first variables. Figure 6 shows an example of mapping 
step 2 into PrT construct, each transition corresponds to each sub-step, the guard 
condition has the variables X and Y, and arc labels defined to hold the guard 
condition variables between transitions.  
 
Figure 6: Repetitive Step Mapping Representation Example  
3.2.1.3 Mapping a Concurrent Step into PrT Constructs 
A Concurrent or Parallel step represents a parallel/concurrent action executed by 
an actor on the system environment. Keywords like parallel, concurrent, and other 
keywords indicate that it is a concurrent step. Similar to the repeatable step, the concurrent 
step has sub-steps or blocks that represent the parallel blocks. Concurrent step is mapped 
to PrT constructs as follows: 
1. Define a transition “t(i)” for each block. 
2. Define output place “P-OUT” for each transition “t(i)” defined in the previous step. 
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3. Use output arc “R-OUT” to connect each transition with corresponding transition 
t(i). 
4. Define Input Place “P-IN”, that will be representing the input place for all of the 
transitions. 
5. Use input arc “R-IN” to connect the “P-IN” with all transitions “t(i)”. 
6. Use arc label for “R-IN” to define the input parameters and arc label for “R-OUT” 
to define the output parameter if that parameter exists. 
Figure 7 shows an example of mapping a Concurrent into PrT construct. The 
“INPUT PLACE” represents the input place for the concurrent net and the “Input-T1, 
Input-T2 and Input-T3” are the input parameter for T1, T2, and T3 respectively and 
“Output-T1, Output-T2, and Output-T3” represent the output parameter for T1, T2, and 
T3, where, “T1-Output-Place, T2-Output-Place, and T3-Output-Place” represent the output 
place for the T1, T2, and T3 respectively.  
 
Figure 7: Parallel Step Mapping Representation Example 
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3.2.1.4 Mapping a Conditional Step into PrT Constructs 
A Conditional step is a simple step with a guard condition. Conditional step 
contains two parts, IF and ELSE parts. The guard condition of the conditional step can be 
extracted from the IF part. Conditional step can be mapped into PrT construct as follows: 
1. Define transition “t” for IF part and other transition “t” for the EISE part. 
2. Define output place for each transition in previous step P-OUT. 
3. Define a single input place P-IN for the conditional step (i.e. for the IF part and 
ELSE part). 
4. Use input arc R-IN to connect the P-IN with all transitions. 
5. Use output arc R-OUT to connect each transition with corresponding output place 
P-OUT. 
6. Define guard condition for each transition. 
7. Use input arc label to define the input parameter for each transition and output arc 
label to define the output parameters. 
Figure 8 shows an example of mapping a Conditional step into PrT construct. The 
model has one input place which is labeled “Conditional-Input-Place” and two transitions, 
the first one is “Transition-T1-IF-PART” that represents the IF part in a conditional step 
which is a transition that will be fired if the input value “Input” is equal to 5, whereas, the 
“Transition-T2-ELSE-PART” represents the ELSE part that will be fired if the “input” 




Figure 8: Conditional Statement Mapping Example. 
3.2.1.5 Mapping Misuse Case Main Flow into PrT Constructs 
The misuse case main flow may have a combination of more than one step of 
different types, such as simple step and/or repeatable step, representing the attack 
scenarios. In order to extract the PrT constructs from the main flow that represents the 
misuse case security test model, the following steps have been followed:  
1. Misuse case main flow consists of “I” steps (e.g. I = 1, 2, 3... n). Starting from the 
first step of the main flow of the misuse case, define the step type (e.g. Simple 
step). 
2. Based on the step type, use the steps that have been specified and explained in the 
previous sections to model the step in PrT constructs. 
3. Repeat the previous two steps through to the final step of the main flow. 
4. Use direct arc to connect the outplace P_OUT of step (i) with the transition of step 
“(i+1)”. Starting from the first output place P_OUT.  
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5. Verify the precondition of each step (i). The precondition of the transition 
represents the input places and associated arc labels, however, some of the 
transition “t (i)” has two input places. The first input place comes from step 
modeling itself, based on its type. The other input place will come from step 4; if 
the two input places are identical, the input place and directed arc that was created 
by step modeling based on its type should be removed, keeping the input place 
which was created from step 4. Figure 9 shows an example of the extracted security 
test model from Automatically Register User misuse case (see Table 7).  
 
Figure 9: Misuse Case Mapping Representation Example. 
3.2.2 Transforming Mitigation Use Case into PrT Constructs. 
The textual description of mitigation use case describes the security requirements 
to prevent attacks. Based on the understanding of textual descriptions of mitigation use 
cases, a “validation point” is extracted which represents successful resistance to an attack. 
A “Validation point” represents a test oracle for the system regardless of whether it secures 
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against attacks. For example, in an FTP server after executing a command, the FTP server 
responds with an integer value, the integer value returned represents a validation point (e.g. 
0 if successful, any other value if failed). In GPMS application, after performing a redirect 
to another website attack, the validation point will be a GPMS proposal document and not 
another website. To represent the mitigation use cases in PrT constructs, these steps have 
been applied: 
1. Define a transition “t” for the validation point. 
2. Define a P_OUT place for the transition “t”.  
3. Use output arc to connect the transition “t” with P_OUT place.  
3.2.3 Combine Misuse Case and Mitigation Use Case into PrT Constructs 
A security test model consists of misuse cases PrT constructs and mitigation use 
cases PrT constructs. The security test model represents the attacks and the mitigation 
mechanism. To combine the misuse cases PrT with mitigation use case PrT:  
1. Use input arc “R_IN” to connect the final place of the misuse case PrT that 
represents the P_OUT place of the last transition in the main flow of the misuse 
case with mitigation transition “t”. 
2. After combining those PrT constructs, define the initial marking for the security 
test model M0. Places can hold structured data and primitive, called token. Each 
token is a tuple of constants. A constant is a number, symbol, and string. Marking 
is a distribution of tokens in all places of a function net, collecting the tokens from 
all places of the net will be viewed as initial marking(M0). Figure 10 shows an 




Figure 10 : Security Test Model Example. 
3.3 Combine Security Test Models. 
After describing the process of extracting security test model from the misuse case 
textual description which accompanies mitigation use case, it was discovered that each 
misuse case and the related mitigation use case has a security test model. At this point, 
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there was a proposal to combine the security test models into one security test model. There 
are two ways to combine the security test models that have been created. The first method 
is based on STRIDE and the second is based on the Use Case. The main objectives of 
combining the resulted security test models were to improve the quality of generated 
security test cases by reducing the possibility of generating duplicated security test cases 
and reduce the time and effort needed for the modeling process.  
3.3.1 Combine Security Test Models Based on STRIDE 
The misuse case textual description has a misuse case category field, representing 
the misuse case category based on STRIDE methodology. This field has been used to 
combine the misuse cases that have the same STRIDE category to in one security test 
model. To combine the misuse cases based on STRIDE, the following steps have been 
applied: 
1. From misuse case category, collect all the misuse cases that have the same 
STRIDE classification.  
2. In one security test model, map each misuse case into PrT construct based on the 
mapping or modeling techniques discussed in the previous sections. In this step, 
each misuse case will be modeled to cover all the threaten use cases listed in the 
threat point of misuse case textual description.  
3. Model each mitigation use case for each misuse case based on the mitigation 
modeling techniques discussed in the previous section. 
4. Combine the transitions that perform the same functionality and have the same 
input and output into one transition “t”. For example, the first and last transition in 
Figures 11 and 12 are merged into one transition in figure 13. 
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5. Use arc label enumeration to specify each misuse case with corresponding 
mitigation use case. 
6. Define the initial marking M0 for the security test model. Figure 13 shows an 
example of combining misuse cases based on STRIDE. 
 
Figure 11: Rename Security Test Model. 
 
Figure 12: Create Directory Security Test Model. 
 
Figure 13: STRIDE Security Test Model Example 
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3.3.2 Combine Security Test Models Based on Use Case. 
Combining the generated security test models based on Use Case represents the 
second technique of improving the quality of the generated security test models. This 
technique targets all possible specific functional requirement attacks on the system, 
represented by misuse cases. To combine all misuse cases that belong to a specific use 
case, the following steps have been followed: 
1. From the threat point of misuse cases textual description, collect all the misuse 
cases that belong to the targeted use case. 
2. In one security test model, model each misuse case based on the mapping or 
modeling techniques discussed in the previous sections. 
3. Combine all the transitions that perform the same functionality in one transition. 
4. Model each mitigation use case for each misuse case based on the mitigation 
modeling techniques discussed in the previous section. 
5. Use arc label enumeration to specify each misuse case with corresponding 
mitigation use case to map each misuse case with related mitigation use cases in 
the generated security test case. 
6. Define the initial marking M0 of the security test model. 
Figure 14 shows an example of combining all misuse cases and corresponding 
mitigation use cases in Creating a New Proposal Document use case. The first 12 
transitions are performing the same functionality in each misuse case, so each of them 
combined into one transition that represents the functionality provided by that transitions. 
The arc label enumerations have been used to map each misuse case with corresponding 









3.4 Generate Security Test Cases 
The MISTA tool is used to generate security test cases from the security test model. 
The MISTA tool is a Model-Based Integration and System Test Automation. It generates 
executable test code in different languages (e.g. Java, C, C++, C#, VB, HTML) based on a 
given Model Implementation Description (MID). MID consist of a test model, Model 
Implementation Mapping (MIM), and user-provided Helper Code (HC). To create test 
cases by using MISTA we follow the following steps. 
1. Build Test Model. MISTA uses function nets high-level Petri nets as a primary 
notation for a test model. We use the security test model that has been created in 
the previous step to be the test model. 
2. Create MIM Specification. MIM maps the elements of the test model into 
implementation constructors for test code generation. MIM include different 
options elements such as hidden event/conditions, object, methods, options, 
accessors, and mutators. However, we used object option that maps constants in all 
token to the objects, the constants we have in the test model like injecting code. We 
also used methods that map the events/transitions in the test model to a block of 
code. 
3. Create Helper Code. It allows providing additional code to make the generated test 
code executable. HC includes different options such as header code, teardown, and 
setup etc. We used helper code setup option to initialize the instance variables 
before the test cases start and we used header code to include the needed header 
files and other global variables. After fulfillment the previous steps, we created 
security test cases in C language for FileZilla server and security test cases in Java 
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for GPMS system by using reachability tree coverage. Figure 15 shows an example 
of generated security test case for FileZilla server in C and Figure 16 shows an 
example of security test case in Java for GPMS system. 
 
Figure 15: A Sample FileZilla Server Security Test Case. 
 
Figure 16: A Sample GPMS Security Test Case.
34 
 
CHAPTER FOUR CASE STUDY I: FILEZILLA FTP SERVER 
In order to validate the applicability of the proposed approach, two case studies 
have been conducted: FileZilla FTP server, and GPMS. The two applications have different 
business logic, user and system requirements, and programming languages.  
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a standard protocol, used widely with remote 
computer systems and transferring files between systems. FileZilla FTP server is a popular 
FTP server implementation which, as of April 2016, is the seventh most downloadable 
program on Source Forge [21]. FileZilla server 0.9.53 has 90,653 line of C++ code and 123 
classes used in this case study. 
4.1 Misuse Case Modeling 
4.1.1 Defining FileZilla FTP Server Use Cases 
FileZilla server documentation, comprehensive understating of the FileZilla server 
source code, and the full documentation of FTP specification in the Request for Comment 
(RFC) published by internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) are considered the major 
source of defining the use cases of FileZilla FTP server. FileZilla FTP server offers all FTP 
operations such as download files, upload files, create a directory, login…etc. In addition, 
FileZilla server offers administrative services. After defining the use cases, a textual 
description for each identified use case has been created. Table 8 is an example of use case 





Figure 17: FileZilla Server Use Case Diagram. 
Table 8: FileZilla FTP Server Delete Files Use Case Textual Description. 
Use case # UC2 
Use case 
name 
Delete files and/or Directories. 
Actors User, System. 
Goal 
To delete a file or/and directories from the client machine to 
FTP server. 
Preconditions 
1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor provides the “DELE” command with remote 
destination folder/directory path and its name by using command 
line tool.  
2. The system receives the “DELE” command request. 
3. The system validates the destination file path. 
4. The system deletes the file or the directory. 
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5. The system provides the actor a summary of file/directory 
deleting process. 
6. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
conditions 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1. The actor selects the file/directory that wishing to 
delete in the remote destination folder. 
1.a.2. The actor deletes the file or directory from the available 
actions provided from file or directory properties. The use case 
continuous at System validates source file path in the MF. 
Exception 
Flow 
3.a. The file name does not exist. 
 3.a.2 The system throw error message telling the client that 
the file                              does not exist. 
Recovery 
Flow 
4a. The destination path does not exist or invalid 
file/folder name. 
  4. a.1 The system notifies the actor that the destination does 
not exist. The use case continuous at the actor provides “DELE” 
command with existing destination folder path or with valid 
file/folder name in the MF. 
 
 
4.1.2 Defining FileZilla FTP Server Misuse Cases 
Misuse cases are defined in examining all of the security goals and each STRIDE 
type of every step in the main flow and alternative flow for each use case. Table 9 shows 
the misuse cases created corresponding to STRIDE. After defining misuse cases, a use 
case/misuse case diagram has been created and is shown in Figures 18. After that, a textual 
description for each misuse case has been created. Table 10 is an example of the misuse 
case textual description.  
Table 9: Misuse Cases Corresponding to STRIDE 
Misuse case name S T R I D E 
Inject malicious code     *  
37 
 
Unauthorized modified/ access data  * * *  * 
Crack user passwords *      
Overflow login table misuse case *    *  
 
 
Figure 18 : FileZilla FTP Server Use Case/Misuse Case Diagram 
Table 10: Inject Malicious Code Misuse Case Description 
Misuse case# MUC 2 
Misuse case name Injecting malicious code Attack 
Misuse case category Denial of service attack 
Goal To disturb the system services  
Actor Adversary  
Preconditions 1. The attacker has an account on the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The attacker anonymously login to the system. 
2. The attacker issues MKD command with injecting malicious 
code. 




1. Rename File, Main flow, Step 1, the user sends the RNTO 
command, step 2, the system receives the command and process 
it. 
Mitigation Validate user input mitigation use case 
 
4.1.3 Defining FileZilla FTP Server Mitigation Use Cases 
For each misuse case, the proper mitigation use cases have been identified by using 
STRIDE and other security references such as OWASP. A textual description has been 
created for each. Table 11 is an example of mitigation use case textual description. Figure 
19 shows an example of FileZilla FTP Server use cases/misuse cases/mitigation use cases 
diagram.
 
Figure 19: FileZilla Server Use Case/Misuse Case/Mitigation Use Case Diagram. 
Table 11: Validate User Permission Mitigation Use Case Description. 
Mitigation use case # 
 
MITI-UC 2 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Validate user permission 
Goal 





The actor login to the system as an anonymous or legitimate 
user. 
Main Flow 
1. Retrieve the actor permission. 
2. Read the actor permission for the requesting command. 
3. Return the right actor permission for the requesting command. 
4. Based on the returned result the system will throw error  
Post Condition Read and validate the right the permission for the actor. 
Priority High 
4.2 Create Security Test Model 
Security test models have been extracted based on the textual description of misuse 
cases accompanying mitigation use cases by using the extraction techniques that have been 
discussed in the previous sections of chapter 3. Security test models have been combined 
by using the STRIDE and Use Case combination techniques that were discussed 
previously. Figure 20 shows an example of a STRIDE combination and Figure 21 shows 








Figure 21: Security Test Model Based on Use Case. 
4.3 Generate Security Test Cases 
FileZilla FTP server security test cases have been generated based on the extracted 
security test models by using MISTA tool. MISTA tool generates test cases based on the 
given MID. A MID has been created which consists of the test model, MIM, and HC. After 
implementing all of these, MISTA generates test cases. Figure 16 gives an example of these 
generated test cases.  
 
Figure 22: FileZilla FTP Server Security Test Case. 
4.4 Evaluation of Security Test Cases. 
After applying the presented approach, 11 use cases have been identified, covering 
the majority of the FileZilla FTP server functionalities. Table 12 shows; the use cases, the 
number of misuse cases, and the number of security test cases have been generated for each 
use case.  
In the first step, security test cases were executed against the FileZilla. In order to 
further the evaluation of the security test cases, we used a mutation testing method. 
Mutation testing is a method of injecting faults into original source code of the software 
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system to test whether the test cases can find the injected faults or not. A mutant is a version 
of software source code with injected faults. 38 security mutants were created using 
common vulnerabilities in C++ and security problems with FTP. This process is shown in 
Table 13.  
The vulnerability is revealed; a mutant is said to be killed if one of the security test 
cases successfully attack. Security test cases were executed against the created mutants, 
killing 33 out of 38 mutants. The five remaining mutants have logical errors in the 
administration functions provided by FileZilla server that could lead to different attacks 
such as DoS. The behavior of these security vulnerabilities is not included in the misuse 
case modeling. Table 14 shows the results of performing the security test cases against the 
mutants. These results show the mutant name, the mutant description, the STRIDE 
category, the expected result, and the actual results of executing the security test cases. 
 




Number of test 
cases 
Download file 2 2 
Create Directory 2 2 
Upload file 2 2 
Delete file/directory 2 2 
Rename files/directory 2 2 
List Directory 2 2 
List Subdirectories 2 2 
Append file 2 2 
Logout 2 2 
Login 2 2 
Change to passive mode 2 2 





Table 13: FileZilla Server Security Mutants 
 
 















































































Number of mutants 
killed 
Buffer overflow 3 3 




Memory leak 2 2 
Format String 2 2 
Integer overflow 1 1 
Incorrect access control 14 11 
Business logic flaws 6 4 
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CHAPTER FIVE CASED STUDY II: GRANT PROPOSAL MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (GPMS) 
GPMS application is a web-based workflow management application for replacing 
the manual approval process for grant proposal submission. The process of creating a 
research proposal, submitting and tracking the proposal status is time-consuming. During 
the process of submission until the final approval decision, many parties can become 
involved which raises a delegation of authority problem which required a change of 
security policies. GPMS provides a fine-grained control over the security policies by 
separating the workflow of the program from the access control policies. 
The GPMS system has been developed as a research project that uses the XCAML 
standard language for specifying access control policies in software applications. It is 
implemented in Java language with, JSON API, JSP, web services API, and Mongo 
database. Currently, GPMS has 24,128 lines of java code and 84 classes.  
5.1 Misuse Case Modeling 
5.1.1 Defining GPMS Use Cases 
GPMS documentations, comprehensive understanding of the source code, user 
experience, and team discussions represent the major sources of defining GPMS use cases. 
GPMS provides a different type of functionalities such as; create new proposal document, 
create new users, delete, submit, archive proposals based on the user permission, providing 
user notification, export to excel, administration services such as managing proposals, and 
managing users…etc. After defining the use cases, the textual description of each has been 
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created. Table 15 is an example of these use case textual descriptions. Figure 23 is an 
example of the use case diagram that has been created. 
 





Table 15: Approve a Proposal by Business Manager Use Case Description. 
Use case # UC-3 
Use case name Approve a Proposal by Business Manager 
Actor Business Manager.  
Goal To approve the proposal by the business manager. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal status is ready for business manager approval. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor is logged in.  
2. The actor selects “My proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “edit” action.  
4. The actor can edit the “Sponsor and Budget Information” section in 
the proposal. 
5. The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note 
fields. 
6. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal by selecting 
approve/disapprove action. 
7. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications 
to the PI, Co-PI, IRB and the Dean, Else, the system will send a 
notification to system sends an email to PI, Co-PI, Department chair, 
IRB, and all Business Managers. 
8. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
9. The system sends a confirmation message. 
10. The system records that on the user audit log. 
11. The system records in the system log.  
Post-Condition 
1. If the actor approved the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
ready for Dean’s approval. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status will change 
to not submitted.  
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor opens check the notification tab 
2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at 
The actor approves/disapproves the proposal in MF. 
Exception flow  NONE 








5.1.2 Defining GPMS Misuse Cases 
GPMS misuse use cases have been defined by applying STRIDE methodology and 
security goals to each step in the use case main flow and alternative flow. Table 16 
illustrates the misuse cases types corresponding to STRIDE. After defining the misuse 
cases, the textual description has been created for each of the defined misuse cases. Table 
17 is an example of misuse case textual description. Figure 24 demonstrates the use 
cases/misuse cases diagram that has been created. 
Table 16: Misuse Cases STRIDE Classifications. 
Misuse Case 
Type 
S T R I D E 
Authentication & 
session management 
*    *  
Cross-Site scripting 
(XSS) & Cross-Site 
request forgery 
(CSRF). 
 *  * * * 
Injecting Malicious 
Code 




 *    * 
Access Control 
Abusing Workflow. 
    * * 
File Path Injection.    * * * 
Upload Dangerous 
Content. 
 *    * 
Overwrite Other 
Files. 
 *    * 
Quota Overload 
Denial of Service 
DoS. 





Figure 24: GPMS Use Case/Misuse Case Diagram 
Table 17: Disable Submit Action Misuse Case Description 
Misuse case # MUC-4 
Misuse case name 
Disable Submit Action Attack. 
Misuse case category 
Information disclosure, DoS and elevation of 
privilege.  
Goal To disable the proposal submission functionality. 
Actor Adversary 
Preconditions 
1. The actor has an account on the system or has other user 
login information. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor selects a proposal and opens it by select edit 
action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or 
disapprove proposal actions. 
Post-conditions 
1. The disable action will be disabled. 




1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills 
the “Certification/Signatures” section by filling: 
“Signature(s), Date and Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, 
The actor sign the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main 
flow, Step 4, The actor sign the proposal by filling: 
“Signature(s), Date and Note” fields. 
4. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main 
flow, Step 4, The actor sign the proposal by filling: 
“Signature(s), Date and Note” fields. 
5. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, 
Step 3, The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), 
Date and Note” fields 
6. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main 
Flow, Step 4, The actor signs the proposal by filling the 
signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main 
Flow, Step 5, The actor signs the proposal by filling the 
signature, date, and note fields. 
Mitigation Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
5.1.3 Defining GPMS Mitigation Use Cases 
Mitigation use cases have been defined by STRIDE, Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP), and other security techniques. After defining the proper 
mitigation use cases, a textual description has been created for each of these mitigation use 
cases. Table 18 is an example of the GPMS mitigation use case textual description. Use 





Figure 25: GPMS Use Case/Misuse Case/Mitigation Use Case Diagram 
Table 18: GPMS Mitigation Use Case Textual Description 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 2 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Validating file extensions and contents. 
Goal To prevent uploading dangerous files to the system. 
Precondition 1. The actor upload files to the system. 
Main Flow 
1. Validate the uploading file extension by using whitelist 
technique. 




1. The application prevents uploading files with a malicious 
extension such as. JSP. 
2. The application prevents uploading files with malicious 
contents with the correct extension. 
Priority High 
 
5.2 Create Security Test Model 
After defining the GPMS misuse cases and proper mitigation use cases, security 
test models have been extracted by using the techniques discussed in chapter 3. Security 
test models have also been combined based on STRIDE and Use Case. Figure 26 is an 
example of a security test model based on STRIDE. Figure 27 is an example of security 
test model based on Use Case. 
 








5.3 Generate Security Test Cases 
Security test cases have been generated based on the extracted security test model 
using MISTA tool. Security test cases have been generated in Java language with 
reachability tree coverage. Figure 28 presents an example of security test cases based on 
STRIDE security test model.  
 
Figure 28: GPMS Security Test Case Example.  
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5.4 Evaluation of Security Test Cases. 
As a result of applying our approach, 19 use cases were created to cover all the 
functionalities of GPMS. 30 distinct misuse cases have been identified by applying 
STRIDE and security goals that cover most of the attacks that might occur in a web-based 
application. All of the misuse cases have been applied to the GPMS use cases. Security test 
models have been extracted and combined based on STRIDE and Use Case, and the 
security test cases which have been generated based on the security test models.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of the generated security test cases, all of the security 
test cases have been executed against each use case of the GPMS system. 147 security test 
cases successfully attacked the system and revealed security vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by any system adversary such as Cross-Site scripting attacks, update data for 
other users, access and modify to other user data and DoS attacks…etc. Table 19 shows 
the result of the security test for GPMS system which demonstrates: misuse cases, 
corresponding use cases threaten by the misuse case, the result of execution attacks (i.e.; 
Pass means successful attack. Fail means failed attack), STRIDE category, the 
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CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Results Analysis 
This thesis presented the approach of security testing with misuse case modeling 
by extracting security test cases from the misuse cases accompanying mitigation use cases 
and evaluates the effectiveness of the resulted security test cases in revealing software 
security vulnerabilities. The new structured mapping approach of a textual description of 
misuse cases and mitigation use cases to security test model presented in 
Predicate/Transition net has been implemented, and combination techniques of security 
test models by using STRIDE and Use Case have also been implemented as applied in two 
case studies with two completely different conditions. In FileZilla server case study, the 
approach has been applied after the development process had been completed. In GPMS 
system, the approach has been applied through to the development process.  
In both case studies, a structured process has been used to identify the software 
system use cases based on the application’s documentation and user experience. Misuse 
cases have been defined in a structured manner by applying STRIDE classifications and 
security goals against the software systems use cases. The misuse cases in both case studies 
covered the majority of security threats for each system function provided. The proper 
mitigation use cases have also been defined by applying STRIDE, OWASP, and other 
security techniques that can prevent the misuse cases for each case study.  
In both studies, all the misuse cases accompanying mitigation use cases have been 
transformed successfully in a structured manner to the corresponding security test model 
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presented in Predicate/Transitions nets based on the mapping techniques presented in this 
approach. All of the generated security test models have been successfully converted to the 
executable code by specifying the MISTA MIME specifications. 
Security test model combination techniques have been applied to all of the 
generated security test models. All of the resulted security test models were successfully 
combined by using STRIDE and Use Case techniques. All of the combined security test 
models have been successfully converted to executable code.  
The generated security test cases from the combined security test models based on 
STRIDE technique are efficient for testing the security of a software system against 
specific security threat type (i.e., privilege elevation threat). In FileZilla FTP Server case 
study, the generated security test cases can kill 0.868 (33/38) of the security mutants and 
revealed two security vulnerabilities. The first vulnerability is overflow from the login table 
while the other is in retrieving the currently running server version that might give the 
attacker an idea of a possible attack by looking into the public figures.  
Both case studies show that the generated security test cases from the combined 
security test models based on Use Case technique are effective for testing the security of a 
specific feature or service provided by a software system. In FileZilla FTP Server case 
study, 22 security test cases have killed 33/38 of the security mutants. In GPMS case study, 
153 security test cases have been applied against all of the system functions. They have 
revealed 24 security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a system adversary such as 
cross-site scripting attacks to include; injecting JavaScript code to disable all the proposal 
actions or other XCMAL attacks such as; without permissions, update proposal document 
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fields information, and other security vulnerabilities such as file path inactions and DoS of 
uploading large files (see Table 19). 
Both studies show that security testing with misuse case modeling is particularly 
efficient and effective. The generated security test cases based on STRIDE and Use Case 
combination techniques are efficient and both combination techniques generate the same 
number of security test cases that killed the same number of mutants in FileZilla FTP 
Server case study. 
Evidence of the effectiveness of security testing with misuse case modeling in both 
case studies is that the misuse cases and the resulting security test models are built as if the 
tester is an intelligent system adversary and the generated security test cases are direct to 
the target. i.e. the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the system adversary.  
6.2 Future Work 
Developing a tool to automatically extract a security test model is a method superior 
to extracting the security test model from the textual description of misuse cases 
accompanying mitigation use cases by hand. For example, a tool that assists in managing 
and tracing the use cases, that are related to misuse cases and mitigation use case, then 
mapping the misuse cases and mitigation use case to security test model as represented in 
Predicate/Transition net is beneficial because of the intensive amount of detailed work that 
extracting and managing the security test models, use cases, misuse cases, and mitigation 
use cases requires. Any tool that could automate or semi-automate any of the approach 
steps would a be positive for such a system as that tool would save time and would 
eliminate unnecessary errors. 
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Another possible research scope is by including misuse case modeling through the 
agile software development process. Similar to use case, a user story is a high-level artifact 
that captures the requirements description and contains information such as what is the 
feature, why that feature is needed. Extending the user story to include the potential 
security threats, the consequences of these threats, and possible mitigation techniques for 
the system feature will help to address the software system security requirements in the 
early stages of the software development process and provide a reliable software system 
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A.1 FileZilla Server Use Cases 
A.1.1 FileZilla FTP Server Uploading Files Use Case Description 
Table 20: FileZilla FTP Server Uploading File Use Case. 





Goal To upload a file from client machine to FTP server system. 
Preconditions 1. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 1. The actor provides the “STOR” command with the remote 
destination folder and local source file paths by using 
command line tool.  
2. The system receives the STOR command request. 
3. The system validates destination folder path.  
4. The system provides the actor a summary of file uploading. 
5. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
condition 
1. The file stored in the destination folder. 
2. The file has the same name. 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1. The actor drags the file from local source folder in 
the client machine. 
1.a.2. The actor drops the source file into the remote 
system destination folder. The use case continuous at the System 
receives STOR command in the MF. 
Exception 
Flow 
6a. The destination folder does not have enough space. 
6.a.1. The system sends an error message that informs the 
user cannot upload the file. 
Recovery 
Flow 
4a. The remote destination file path does not exist. 
4.a.1. The system notifies the user that the destination 
folder does not exist. The use case continuous at The actor 
provides STOR command with existing remote destination folder 








A.1.2 FileZilla FTP Server Delete File/Directory Use Case Description 
Table 21: FileZilla FTP Server Delete File/Directory Use Case. 
Use case # UC2 
Use case 
name 
Deleting files and/or Directories. 
Actors User, System. 
Goal To delete a file or/and directories from the client machine to 
FTP server. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 1. The actor provides the “DELE” command with remote 
destination folder/directory path and its name by using 
command line tool.  
2. The system receives the “DELE” command request. 
3. The system validates the destination file path. 
4. The system deletes the file or the directory. 
5. The system provides the actor a summary of file/directory 
deleting process. 
6. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
conditions 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1. The actor selects the file/directory that wishing to 
delete in the remote destination folder. 
1.a.2. The actor deletes the file or directory from the 
available actions provided from file or directory properties. The use 
case continuous at System validates source file path in the MF. 
Exception 
Flow 
3.a. The file name does not exist. 
3.a.2 The system throws error message telling the client that 
the file                              does not exist. 
Recovery 
Flow 
4a. The destination path does not exist or invalid 
file/folder name. 
 4. a.1 The system notifies the actor that the destination 
does not exist. The use case continuous at the actor provides 
“DELE” command with existing destination folder path or with 






A.1.3 FileZilla FTP Server Create Directory Use Case Description 
Table 22: FileZilla FTP Server Create Directory Use Case. 




Actors User, System. 
Goal 
To create a directory from the client machine to the FTP 
server. 
Precondition 
1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor provides the “MKD” command with specifying the 
destination folder path with a folder name that wishing to create 
by using command line tool.  
2. The system receives the “MKD” command request. 
3. The system validates the destination file path. 
4. The system validates the name of the folder.  
5. The system creates the directory and saves it. 
6. The system provides the actor a summary of the created 
directory. 
7. The system records the request in the log file.  
Post-
conditions 
1. The folder created in the correct destination. 






1. a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1. a.1 The actor selects the destination folder that wishing 
to create the folder inside of it. 
1. a.2 The actor creates a directory from the available 
actions provided from destination folder properties, the use case 




 6. a. The destination folder does not have enough space. 
6. a.1 The system disconnected and starting over again and 
never finishing creating the directory. 
Recovery 
Flow 
4. a. The destination folder path does not exist. 
4.a.1 The system notifies the actor that the destination 
folder does not exist, the use case continuous at The actor provide 




5. a. Invalid folder name. 
5. a.1 The system notifies the actor that the folder name is 
invalid, the use case continuous at the actor provide “MKD” 
command with the valid folder name in the MF. 
 
A.1.4 FileZilla FTP Server Download Files Use Case Description 
Table 23: FileZilla FTP Server Download Files Server Use Case. 
Use case # UC 4 
Use case name Download files. 
Actors User, System. 
Goal 
To download a file from the system. 
 
Precondition 
1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor provides the “RETE” command with the remote source 
file and local destination folder paths by using command line 
tool.  
2. The system receives the RETE command request. 
3. The system validates source file path.  
4. The system validates the source file name.  
5. The system provides the actor a summary of downloading the 
file. 
6. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
condition 
1. The file downloaded in the destination folder. 
2. The file has the same name. 







1.a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1 The actor drags the file from the remote source folder 
from the system machine. 
1.a.2 The actor drops the remote source file into the local 
destination folder. The use case continuous at the System receives 
RETE command in the MF. 
Exception 
Flow 
2.a. The file name does not exist. 
2.a.2 The system throws error message telling the client that 






4.a. The destination path does not exist. 
4. a.1 The system notifies the actor that he/she/system the 
source file does not exist. The use case continuous at the actor 
provides “RETE” command with existing source file path in the MF. 
5. a. Invalid file name. 
5. a.1 The system notifies the actor that he/she/system the 
source file name is invalid, the use case continuous at the actor 
provide “RETE” command with the valid file name in the MF. 
A.1.5 FileZilla FTP Server Login Description 
Table 24: FileZilla FTP Server Login Use Case 
Use case # UC5 
Use case 
name 
Log into the system. 
Actors User, System. 
Goal  To log into the system by using username and password 
Precondition 1- The system is up and running. 
2- The actor already registered in the system. 
Main Flow 1. The actor provides the “PASS” command with specifying 
username, password, and the system IP address by using 
command line tool.  
2. The system validates the actor username and password.  
3. The system validates the number of failed trials. 
4. The system validates the actor enabling status. 
5. The system validates the max number of connections. 
6. The system validates the IP address. 
7. The system changes to the actor home directory.  
8. The system records the login request in the log file. 
Post-
condition 
1. The actor successfully login to the system. 






1.a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1 The actor provides the username, password and system 
IP address in the GUI fields. The use case continuous at The system 
receives the PASS command. 
Exception 
Flow 
7.a. The home directory does not exist. 
   7.a.1 The system informs the actor that cannot get the 
home directory. 
4.a. No more login trails left. 
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   4.a.1 The system suspends the user account. 
   4.a.2 The system informs the actor that the account has 
been suspended. 
5.a. The actor account disabled. 
5.a.1 The system informs the actor that the account has 
been suspended. 
6.a. Max number of available connection reached. 
6.a.1 The system inform cannot accept any connection 
because the max number of login actors has been reached. 
7.a. The system refused any connection from this IP 
address. 
7.a.1 The system informs the actor that cannot accept any 
connection from this IP address. 
Recovery 
Flow 
3.a invalid username and/or password and more trails 
left 
3.a.1 The system informs the actor that the username or 
password are not correct, the use case continuous at The system 
receive the PASS command with the correct username and/or 
password in the MF. 
 
A.1.6 FileZilla FTP Server Rename Files/Directories Use Case Description 
Table 25: FileZilla FTP Server Rename Files/Directories Use Case. 
Use case # UC 6 
Use case 
name 
Rename files or directories. 
Actors User, System. 
Goal To rename a file or a directory 
Precondition 
1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor provides the “RNTO/RNFR” command with the old 
and new name of the remote file or folder by using command 
line tool. The system receives the RNTO/ RNFR command 
request. 
2. The system validates file/folder path.  
3. The system validates the new name.  
4. The system renames file/folder. 
5. The system provides the actor a summary of renaming the 
file/folder. 






1. The file/folder renamed successfully. 






1.a The actor uses GUI client application. 
1.a.1 The actor selects the remote file/folder that wishing 
to rename. 
1.a.2 The actor renames the file from the available actions 
provided from the file properties. The use case continuous at The 
actor provides the “RNTO/RNFR” Command in the MF.  
Exception 
Flow 
2.a. The file/folder does not exist. 




3.a. Invalid new file name/ the new name corresponds to 
already exist file/folder name. 
3.a.1 The system notifies the actor that the new name file 
is invalid or already exist, the use case continuous at the actor 
provide “RETE” command with the valid file name in the MF. 
 
A.1.7 FileZilla FTP Server Append Files Use Case Description 
Table 26: FileZilla FTP Server Append Files Use Case. 





Goal To append a file from client machine to the system. 
Preconditions 
1- The system is up and running. 
2- The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1- The actor provides the “APPE” command with the remote 
destination folder and local source file paths by using command 
line tool.  
2- The system validates remote destination folder path. 
3- The system receives file data and stores it in the destination 
folder. 
4- The system provides the actor a summary of the appending file. 
5- The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
condition 
1- The file appended with same data being sent from the actor. 











3.a. The destination folder does not have enough space. 
3.a.1 The system disconnected and starting over again 
and never finishing appending the file. 
Recovery 
Flow 
3.a. The remote destination file path does not exist. 
3.a.1 The system notifies the user that the destination 
folder does not exist. The use case continuous at The actor 
provides APPE command with existing remote destination folder 
in the MF. 
  
 
A.1.8 FileZilla FTP Server List Directories Use Case Description 
Table 27: FileZilla FTP Server List Directories Use Case. 




Actors User, System. 
Goal To list directories on the shared folder 
Preconditions 
1. The system is up and running. 
2. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor provides the “MLSD/LIST” command with remote 
destination folder/directory path and its name by using 
command line tool.  
2. The system receives the “MLSD/LIST” command request. 
3. The system validates the directory path. 
4. The system lists the files and the directories. 
5. The system provides the actor a summary directory list process. 
6. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
conditions 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
    1.a.1. The actor selects the directory that wishing to list 
in the remote      destination folder. 
    1.a.2. The actor select list action from the available 
actions provided from directory properties. The use case continuous 





3.a. The directory name does not exist. 
    3.a.2 The system throws error message telling the client 
that the directory                              does not exist. 
Recovery 
Flow 
3a. The directory path does not exist or invalid directory 
name. 
    3. a.1 The system notifies the actor that the directory 
does not exist. The use case continuous at the actor provides 
“MLSD” command with existing directory path or with folder name 
in the MF. 
 
 
A.1.9 FileZilla FTP Server List Subdirectory Use Case Description 
Table 28: FileZilla FTP Server List Subdirectory Use Case. 




Actors User, System. 
Goal To list directories on the shared folder 
Preconditions 
3. The system is up and running. 
4. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
7. The actor provides the “NLIST” command with remote 
destination folder/directory path and its name by using 
command line tool.  
8. The system receives the “NLIST” command request. 
9. The system validates the directory path. 
10. The system lists the files and the directories. 
11. The system provides the actor a summary directory list process. 
12. The system records the request in the log file. 
Post-
conditions 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 
    1.a.1. The actor selects the directory that wishing to list 
in the remote      destination folder. 
    1.a.2. The actor select list action from the available 
actions provided from directory properties. The use case continuous 
at System validates source file path in the MF. 
Exception 
Flow 
3.a. The Subdirectory name does not exist. 
    3.a.2 The system throws error message telling the client 





3a. The Subdirectory path does not exist or invalid 
directory name. 
    3. a.1 The system notifies the actor that the directory 
does not exist. The use case continuous at the actor provides 
“MLSD” command with existing directory path or with folder name 
in the MF. 
 
 
A.1.10 FileZilla FTP Server Logout Use Case Description 
Table 29: FileZilla FTP Server Logout Use Case 
Use case # UC9 
Use case 
name 
Logout from the system. 
Actors User/System. 
Goal To quit and close the connection from the system 
Preconditions 1. The actor logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor issues the “QUIT” command. 
2. The system closes the connection to the client 
3. The system records the logout process in the log file 
Post-
condition 






1a. The actor uses GUI client application. 








A.1.11 FileZilla FTP Server List System Features Use Case Description 
Table 30: FileZilla FTP Server List System Features Use Case. 









To list the system features. 
Preconditions 1. The actor already logged into the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor issues the “FEAT” command. 
2. The system response with feature list supported 
3. The system records the actor request in the log file 
Post-
condition 













A.2 FileZilla Server Misuse Cases 
A.2.1 Unauthorized Access/Modify Files Misuse Case Description 
Table 31: Unauthorized Access/Modify Files Misuse Case. 
Misuse case# MUC2 
Misuse case 
name 
Unauthorized access/modifying files. 
Misuse case 
category 
Privilege Elevation, Tampering, Repudiation 
Goal 
To access and/or modify files/folders without permission 
validation.  
Actor Adversary  
Preconditions 
1. The system permits anonymous login. 
2. The anonymous user does not have a permission to access and 
modify files. 
Main Flow 
1. The attacker or legitimate user login to the system anonymously 
or by using valid username and password. 
2. The attacker upload files to the system 
3. The attacker deletes files from the system. 
4. The attacker renames and lists files of the system. 





The attacker successfully tempers the system data.  
Threat point 
1. Uploading files, Main flow, Step 3 system validates user 
permission 
2. Downloading files, Main flow, Step 3, the system validates user 
permission. 
3. Creating directory, Main flow, Step 3, the system validates user 
permission. 
4. Change work directory, Main flow, Step 3, the system validates 
user permission. 
5. Append File, Main flow, Step 3, system validates user 
permission. 
6. Delete folder/files, Main flow, Step 3, system validates user 
permission. 
7. Rename Folder/file. Main flow, Step 3, system validates user 
permission. 
Mitigation Validate user permission mitigation use case. 
 
A.2.2 Crack User Password Misuse Case Description 
Table 32: Crack User Password Misuse Case. 
Misuse case# MUC1 
Misuse case 
name 




Goal To crack the user login information. 
Actor System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1- The system enables anonymous login. 
 
Main Flow 1- The attacker issues the login command with username and 
guessing the password. 
2- The attacker keeps sending login command with username and 






The attacker cracks the user password. 
Threat point User login, Main flow, Step 1, the actor issues login 
command.  
Mitigation Auto ban IP address mitigation use case 
A.2.3 Overflow Login Table Misuse Case Description 
Table 33: Overflow Login Table Misuse Case. 
Misuse case# MUC3 
Misuse case 
name 
Overflow login table. 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, Denial of service attack 
Goal To overflow the login table and crash the system.  
Actor Adversary  
Preconditions 2. The attacker has an account on the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The attacker issues login command with the user id. 
2. The attacker keeps issuing; 
       2.1 iterate the login command for many times. 
3. The system login table cannot handle any new connection for 
the same user id. 
Post-
conditions 
Overflow login table and the system will crash  
Threat point 
User login, Main flow, Step 1 The actor provides the 
“PASS” command 
Mitigation Auto ban IP address Mitigation use case 
 
A.2.4 Injecting Malicious Code Misuse Case Description 
Table 34: Injecting Malicious Code Misuse Case. 
Misuse case# MUC4 
Misuse case 
name 
Injecting malicious code 
Misuse case 
category 
Denial of service attack 
Goal 
To disturb the system services   
 




1. The system enables anonymous login. 
 
Main Flow 
1. The attacker anonymously log in to the system. 
2. The attacker injecting malicious code LIST command. 
3. The attacker injecting malicious code in the Download 
command. 
4. The attacker injecting malicious code in the Rename command. 
5. The attacker injecting malicious code in the Upload command 
Post-
conditions 
The system will be crashed or suspended.  
Threat point 
1. Change work directory, Main flow, Step 2 The actor start 
sending file data. 
2. Upload a file, Main flow, Step 1 the user sends the STOR 
command, step 2, the system receives the command and process 
it. 
3.  Download File, Main flow, Step 1, the user sends the RETE 
command, step 2, the system receive the command and process 
it. 
4. Rename file/folders. Main flow, Step 1, the user sends the 
RENTO command, step 2, the system receives the command 
and process it. 
5. Create Folder, Main flow, Step 1, the user sends the MKD 
command, step 2, the system receives the command and process 
it. 
6. List directory, Main flow, Step 1, the user sends the LIST, LIST 
commands, step 2, and the system receive the command and 
process it. 
Mitigation Validate user input mitigation use case 
 





A.3.1 Validate User Input Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 35: Validate User Input Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation 




use case name 
Validate user Input. 
Goal To validate user input. 
Precondition 
 
The actor issues a command with specific input. 
Main Flow 
 
1. Validate the user input against regular expressions, this allows 
to checks the syntax of the user input.  
2. Validates the user input components, this allows the makes sure 
if the user input has malicious code injected. 
3. Return a result of the user input validation to the system. 
4. Based on the returned result the system will throw error or 










A.3.2 Validate User Permission Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 36: Validate User Permission Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation 
use case # 
MITI-UC 2 
Mitigation 
use case name 
 
Validate user permission 
Goal 
To validate the user permission before access and/or 
modifying data. 
Precondition 




1. Retrieve the actor permission. 
2. Read the actor permission for the requesting command. 
3. Return the right actor permission for the requesting command. 
4. Based on the returned result the system will throw error or 
process the actor requesting command.  
Post 
Condition 





A.3.3 Auto Ban IP Address Mitigation Use Case Description 





Use Case Name 
Auto Ban IP Address. 
Goal 








1. Record The Number of Tries of the Login Request for Each IP 
Address. 
2. Compare The Max Value of the Allowed IP Address for Issues 
Login Request with Recorded Number for the Number of tries 
3. Block Incoming Login Request From The IP Address for A 


















A.4 FileZilla Server Security Test Models Based on Use Case Technique  
A.4.1 Uploading Files Use Case Security Test Model 
 
 
Figure 29: Upload Files Use Case Security Test Model. 
A.4.2 Delete File\Directory Use Case Security Test Model 
 




A.4.3 Create Directory Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 31: Create Directory Use Case Security Test Model. 
A.4.4 Download Files Use Case Security Test Model 
 




A.4.5 FileZilla FTP Server Login Use Case Security Test Model 
 















A.4.6 Rename Files\Directories Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 34:  Rename Files/Directory Use Case Security Test Model. 
 




Figure 35: Append Files Use Case Security Test Model. 
A.4.8 List Directories Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 36: List Directories Use Case Security Test Model. 
 
A.4.9 List Subdirectory Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 37: List Subdirectory Use Case Security Test Model. 
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A.4.10 FileZilla FTP Server Logout Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 38: FileZilla FTP Server Logout Use Case Security Test Model. 
 
A.4.11 List System Features Use Case Security Test Model 
 
Figure 39: List System Features Use Case Security Test Model. 
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A.5 FileZilla Server Security Test Models Based on STRIDE Technique  
A.5.1 Denial of Service Category Security Test Model 
 
Figure 40: DoS Security Test Model Part 1. 
 




A.5.2 Privilege Elevation Category Security Test Model 
 
Figure 42: Privilege Elevation Security Test Model 
 
A.5.3 Spoofing Category Security Test Model 
 
Figure 43: Spoofing Security Test Model.
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APPENDIX B CASE STUDY II: GRANT PROPOSAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 




B.1 GPMS Use Cases 
B.1.1 Signup a New User Use Case Description 
Table 38: Signup a New User Use Case. 
Use case # UC-1. 
Use case name Create user account. 
Actor User, System admin. 
Goal To create a user account. 
Preconditions 
1. The user does not have an account before. 
2. The system is up and running. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects “sign up” action. 
2. The system redirects the actor to the signup page. 
3. The actor fills the required fields and selects sign up action. 
4. The system receives the sign up the request and sends a 
notification to the system admin and to the new user. 
5. The actor selects “Manage Users” action. 
6. The actor fills/verifies the User information. 
7. The actor fills “User Position Details” by filling “User College”, 
“Department”, “Position Type”, and “Position Title” 
information. 
8. The system admin activates a new account. 
9. The new user receives activation notification and can access 
his/her account. 
Post-Condition 
1. The user account is created successfully. 
2. The user has access to the system. 
Extension Points Step 9, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
1.a The system admin Create user account. 
  1.a.1 The system admin selects “Manage Users” action. 
  1.a.2 The System admin selects “Add new user” action.  
The use case continuous at The System The system admin 
files/verifies the User information in the MF 
Exception flow NONE. 
Recovery flow 
3.a User selects username or e-mail address already 
exist. 







B.1.2 Create a New Proposal Document Use Case Description 
Table 39: Create a New Proposal Document Use Case. 
Use case # UC-2 
Use case name Create/ Add a Proposal Document.  
Actor The principal investigator (PI). 
Goal To create a new proposal. 
Preconditions 
1. The actor has an account on the system. 
2. The actor job position should be tenured/ Non-tenure track faculty. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects the “Add new Proposal” action. 
3. The system receives the actor request and redirects the user to the new 
proposal page. 
4. The actor fills the “Investigator Information” by filling the Co-PI and 
Senior Personal by selecting the “Add Co-PI” action and “Add Senior 
Personnel” action. 
5. The actor fills the “Project Information” section. The actor fills the 
“Project Title, Project Type, Due Date, Project Period: From, TO Type 
of Request, and Location of Project” fields. 
6. The actor fills the “Sponsor and Budget Information” by filling: “Name 
of Granting Agency, Direct Costs, Total Costs, F&A Costs, and F&A 
Rate” fields. 
7. The actor fills “Cost Share Information” by filling: “Is Institutional 
committed cost share included in the proposal? And Is Third Party 
committed cost share included in the proposal?” fields. 
8. The actor fills the “University Commitments” by filling: “Will new or 
renovated space/facilities be required? Will rental space be required? 
and Does this project require institutional commitments beyond the end 
date of the project?” fields. 
9. The actor fills the “Conflict of Interest and Commitment Information” 
section by filling: “Is there a financial conflict of interest related to this 
proposal? Has the financial conflict been disclosed? and Has there been 
a material change to your annual disclosure form?” fields. 
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10. The actor fills the “Compliance Information” section by filling: “Does 
this project involve the use of Human Subjects? Does this project involve 
the use of Vertebrate Animals? Does this project involve Biosafety 
concerns? and Does this project have Environmental Health & Safety 
concerns?” fields. 
11. The actor fills the “Additional Information” section by filling:  
“Do you anticipate payment(s) to foreign nationals or on 
behalf of foreign nationals? Do you anticipate course release time? 
and Are the proposed activities related to Center for Advanced Energy 
Studies?” fields. 
12. The actor fills the “Collaboration Information” section by filling: Does 
this project involve non-funded collaborations?” filed. 
13. The actor fills the “Proprietary/Confidential Information” section by 
filling: “Does this proposal contain any confidential information which 
is Proprietary that should not be publicly released? Will this project 
involve intellectual property in which the University may own or have 
an interest?” fields. 
14. The actor fills the “Certification/Signatures” section by filling: 
“Signature(s), Date and Note” fields. 
15.  The actor fills “Appendices” section by using the upload file action. 
16. The actor selects the save action to save the proposal.  
17. The system sends notifications to the Co-PI(s) and senior personal.  
18. The system records the request in the user audit log 
 
Post-Condition 
1. The system saves the proposal with correct data submitted by the actor. 
2. The actor can access the proposal.  
Extension Points 1. Step 17, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow NONE. 
Exception flow NONE. 






B.1.3 Submit a Proposal by Principal Investigator (PI) Use Case Description 
Table 40: Submit a Proposal by Principal Investigator (PI) Use Case. 
Use case # UC-3 
Use case name Submit a proposal by principal investigator (PI). 
Actor Principal Investigator (PI).  
Goal To submit the proposal to the department chair. 
Preconditions 
1. The PI created the proposal and signed it. 
2. The Co-PI(s) signed the proposal. 
3. The proposal status not submitted. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to account. 
2. The actor selects “My proposals” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting the edit proposal action.  
4. The system opens the proposal in edit mode. 
5. The actor signs the proposal. 
6. The actor selects the submit action. 
7. The system sends a notification to the department chair, PI, Co-PI(s) and 
Senior Personnel. 
8. The system records the request in the user audit log. 
Post-Condition 
1. The proposal status changed to waiting for chair approval. 
2. The actor has read access to the proposal. 
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the research engine 
   2.a.1 The actor inserts the proposal information in the search 
fields. 
   2.a.2 The system returns the search result. 
   2.a.3 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor selects the submit action in MF 
Exception flow 
4.a CO-PI(s) not signed the proposal 
  4.a.1 The system shows an error message that CO-PIs are not signed 
on the proposal. 




B.1.4 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Dean Use Case Description 
Table 41: Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Dean Use Case. 
Use case # 
UC-4 
Use case name 
Approve/Disapprove a proposal by dean. 
Actor 
The Dean 
Goal To approve/disapprove proposal.  
Preconditions 
1. The proposal signed by all Business Manager. 
2. The proposal approved by all Business Manager. 
3. The proposal status is ready for dean approval. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor signs the proposal by filling the “Signature, Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal by selecting 
approve/disapprove action. 
5. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to 
the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel and University Research Administrator, 
Else, the system will send a notification to PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, 
Department Chair, Business Manager, Dean, University Research 
Administrator, University Research Director and IRB. 
6. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
7. The system sends a confirmation message. 
8. The system records that on the user audit log. 
Post-Condition 
1. If the actor approved the proposal, and the IRBs approved the proposal 
status changed to the ready for Research administrator approval else the 
status will stay ready for IRB approval. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status changed to not 
submitted, and, clear all signatures.  
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor approves/disapproves the proposal in MF.  
Exception flow NONE. 





B.1.5 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Director Use Case Description 
Table 42: Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Director Use Case. 
Use case # UC-5 
Use case name Approve/Disapprove a proposal by Research Director. 
Actor Research Director 
Goal To approve/disapprove the proposal.  
Preconditions 
1. The proposals signed by all research administrators. 
2. The proposal approved by all research administrators. 
3. The proposal status is ready for research director approval. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects “My proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
4. The actor can update the “OSP” section fields in the proposal. 
5. The actor signs the proposal by filling the “Signature, Date and Note” 
fields. 
6. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal by selecting the 
approve/disapprove action. 
7. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to 
the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, University Research Administrator, 
Else, the system will send a notification to System sends an email to PI, 
Co-PI, Senior Personnel, Department Chair, Business Manager, IRB and 
all Deans. 
8. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
9. The system sends a confirmation message. 
10. The system records that on the user audit log. 
Post-Condition 
1. If the actor approved the proposal, the proposal status changed to ready 
for search administrator submission. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status changed to not 
submitted, and, clear all signatures.  
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
  2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
  2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor approve/disapprove the proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE. 






B.1.6 Submit a Proposal by Research Administrator Use Case Description 
Table 43: Submit a Proposal by Research Administrator Use Case. 
Use case # UC-6 
Use case name Submit a proposal by research administrator. 
Actor Research Administrator. 
Goal To submit the proposal. 
Preconditions 
1. The proposal approved by all research directories. 
2. The proposals status ready for research administrator submission 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor can update the following sections of the proposal, such as 
“Investigator Information”, “Project Information”, Sponsor and Budget 
Information”, “Cost share Information”, “UniversityCommitments”, 
“Conflict of Interest and Commitment Information”,” Compliance 
Information”, “Additional Information”, “Collaboration Information”, 
“Proprietary/Confidential Information”, “Certification/Signatures”, and 
“OSP Section”. 
4. The actor signs the proposal by filling the “Signature, Date and Note” 
fields. 
5. The actor submits a proposal. 
6. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
7. The system sends the confirmation message. 
8. The system sends a notification to the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, 
Department Chair, Business manager, Dean, University Research 
Director and IRB. 
9. The system records request on the user audit log. 
10. The system records request on the system log. 
Post-Condition 1. The proposal status changed to be submitted by research administrator. 
Extension Points 1. Step 8, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects the notification tab. 
2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor signs the proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE. 







B.1.7 Withdraw a Proposal by Research Administrator Use Case Description 
Table 44: Withdraw a Proposal by Research Administrator Use Case. 
Use case # UC-7 
Use case name Withdraw a proposal by Research Administrator.  
Actor Research Administrator 
Goal To withdraw the proposal. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal status ready for research administrator approval. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor signs the proposal by filling the “Signature, Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. The actor withdraws a proposal by selecting the withdraws action. 
5. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
6. The system sends the confirmation message. 
7. The system sends a notification to the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel 
Department Chair, Business Manager, Dean, University Research 
Administrator, University Research Director and IRB The system 
records that on the user audit log. 
8. The system records the request in the user audit log. 
9. The system records in the system log. 
Post-Condition 
1. The proposal status changed to withdrawn. 
2. The proposal cannot be updated by PI. 
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor withdraw proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE. 






B.1.8 Delete a Proposal by Principal Investigator (PI) Uses Case Description 
Table 45: Delete a Proposal by Principal Investigator (PI) Use Case. 
Use case # UC-8 
Use case name Delete a proposal by PI 
Actor the principal investigator (PI) 
Goal To delete the proposal document. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal not submitted by PI. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor selects the “Delete” action. 
4. The system processes the requests and deletes the proposal. 
5. The system sends a confirmation message. 
6. The system sends notification PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel. 
7. The system records that in user audit log 
8. The system records that in the system log file.  
Post-Condition 
1. The system successfully deletes the proposal sheet. 
2. The actor cannot find, open, and/or edit the proposal     
Extension Points 1. Step 6, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
Actor Delete proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE 
Recovery flow NONE 
 
B.1.9 Delete a Proposal by Research Director Use Case Description 
Table 46: Delete a Proposal by Research Director Use Case. 
Use case # UC-9 
Use case name Delete a proposal by Research Director 
Actor Research Director 





1. The proposal status is ready for Research Director Approval.  
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor selects the “Delete” action. 
4. The system processes the requests and deletes the proposal. 
5. The system sends confirmation message. 
6. The system sends notification to PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, 
Department Chair, Business Manager, Dean, University Research 
Administrator, University Research Director and IRB. 
7. The system records that in user audit log 
8. The system records that in the system log file.  
Post-Condition 
1. The system successfully deletes the proposal sheet. 
2. The proposal status will change to deleted. 
3. The PI cannot updates/edits the proposal. 
4. The PI cannot have submitted again. 
Extension Points 1. Step 6, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
 2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
Actor Delete proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE 
Recovery flow NONE 
 
B.1.10 Archive a Proposal by Research Director Use Case Description 
Table 47: Archive a Proposal by Research Director Use Case. 
Use case # UC-10 
Use case name Archive a proposal by Research Director.  
Actor Research Director. 
Goal To archive the proposal. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal approved by Research Administrator. 
Main Flow 1. The actor login to his/her account. 
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2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor selects the “Archive” action. 
4. The system processes the requests and archives the proposal. 
5. The system sends a confirmation message. 
6. The system sends a notification to PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, 
Department Chair, Business Manager, Dean, University Research 
Administrator, University Research Director and IRB. 
7. The system records that in user audit log. 
8. The system records that in the system log file. 
Post-Condition 1. The proposal status changed to archived 
2. The proposal cannot be updated by any actor. 
Extension Points 1. Step 6, Notify Users Use Case 
Alternative flow 2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor selects Archive proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE. 
Recovery flow NONE. 
 
B.1.11 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Department Chair Use Case Description 
Table 48: Department Chair Approve/Disapprove a Proposal Use Case. 
Use case # UC-11. 
Use case name Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Department Chair 
Actors The Department Chair. 
Goal Department Chair approve/disapprove proposal.  
Preconditions 1. The proposal is signed by all Co-PI. 
2. The proposal is signed by the PI. 
3. The proposal is submitted by PI. 
4. The proposal status is ready for Chair approval. 
Main Flow 1. The actor logged into the system.  
2. The actor selects “My proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “edit” action. 
4. The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 




6. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to    
the PI, Co-PI, IRB and University Business Manager, Else, the system 
will send a notification to system sends an email to PI, Co-PI, and all 
Department Chairs. 
7. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
8. The system sends a confirmation message. 
9. The system records that on the user audit log. 
10. The system records in the system log.  
Post-condition 1. If the actor approved the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
ready for Business Manager Approval and/or IRB. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
not submitted.  
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative Flow 2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
 2.a.1 The actor opens check the notification tab 
 2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal.  
The use case continuous at The actor approves/disapproves the 
proposal in MF.  
Exception Flow NONE 
Recovery Flow NONE 
 
B.1.12 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Business Manager Use Case Description 
Table 49: Business Manager Approve/Disapprove a Proposal Use Case. 
Use case # UC-12. 
Use case name Business Manager approve/disapprove a proposal. 
Actors The Business Manager. 
Goal Business Manager Approve/Disapprove the proposal.  
Preconditions 1.  The proposal signed by all Department Chair. 
2.  The proposal approved by all Department Chair. 
3.  The proposal status is ready for Business Manager approval. 
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Main Flow 1. The actor is logged in.  
2. The actor selects “My proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “edit” action.  
4. The actor can edit the “Sponsor and Budget Information” section in the 
proposal. 
5. The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note 
fields. 
6. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal by selecting 
approve/disapprove action. 
7. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to 
the PI, Co-PI, IRB and the Dean, Else, the system will send a 
notification to system sends an email to PI, Co-PI, Department chair, 
IRB, and all Business Managers. 
8. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
9. The system sends a confirmation message. 
10. The system records that on the user audit log. 
11. The system records in the system log.  
Post-condition 1. If the actor approved the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
ready for Dean’s approval. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
not submitted. 
Extension Points 1. Step 7, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative Flow 2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor opens check the notification tab 
2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at 
The actor approves/disapproves the proposal in MF.  
Exception Flow NONE 
Recovery Flow NONE 
 
B.1.13 Export to Excel Sheet Use Case Description 
Table 50: Export to Excel Sheet Use Case. 
Use case # UC-13. 
Use case name Export proposals to excel sheet. 
Actors The User. 
Goal To Export to Excel. 
Preconditions 1.  The actor has proposals. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects “My Proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects “Export to Excel” action. 
4. The excel file will start downloading. 
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5. The system records that on the user audit log. 
6. The system records in the system log. 
Post-condition 
1. The file exported to excel. 
2. The excel file has the correct information of the proposals. 
Extension Points NONE 
Alternative Flow NONE. 
Exception Flow NONE. 
Recovery Flow NONE. 
 
B.1.14 Update User Personal Information Use Case Description 
Table 51: Update User Personal Information Use Case. 
Use case # UC-14. 
Use case name Update user personal information. 
Actors The user, the system Admin. 
Goal To update user personal information. 
Preconditions 
1. The actor has an account on the system. 
2. The actor account is activated. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects “Account Settings” action. 
3. The system processes the request and redirects the user to user’ account 
information page. 
4. The actor selects the “General Information” tab and updates the fields for 
each section, such as “User Information”, “Current Address”, “Phone”, 
and “E-mail Address” sections. 
5. The actor selects “User Position Details” tab, and update the required 
fields. 
6. The actor selects “User Login Credentials” tab, and update the required 
fields. 
7. The actor selects “Audit Logs” tab, and check Actions and Audit logs. 
8. The actor selects save action. 
9. The system sends a confirmation message. 
10. The system logs the user’s request in the Audit Log. 
Post-condition 1. The system saves the updated personal information. 
Extension Points NONE 
Alternative Flow 
1.a The system admin Updates user personal information. 
  1.a.1 The system admin selects “Manage Users” action. 
  1.a.2 The system admin selects “edit”, 
The use case continues at The system opens the user’ account 
information page in the MF. 
2.a The Use Update user personal information. 
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 2.a.1 The user selects “My Account” from the drop menu. 
The use case continues at The system opens the user’ account 
information page in the MF. 
Exception Flow NONE. 
Recovery Flow 
3.a The user insert an exist/invalid email 
   3.a.1 The system shows an error message. 
   3.a. 2 The actor inserts another valid email address. 
B.1.15 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by IRB Use Case Description 
Table 52: IRB Approve/Disapprove a Proposal Use Case. 
Use case # UC-15 
Use case name IRB approve/disapprove proposal. 
Actors The IRB. 
Goal Business Manager approve/disapprove proposal. 
Preconditions 
1. The proposal status is ready for IRB approval. 
2. The proposal has a compliance  
Main Flow 
1. The actor is logged in. 
2. The actor selects “My proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “edit” action. 
4. The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
5. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal. 
6. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to 
the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel and Research Administrator, Else, the 
system will send notification to system sends an email to PI, Co-PI, and 
all Department chair. 
7. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
8. The system sends confirmation message. 
9. The system records that on the user audit log. 
Post-condition 
1. If the actor approved the proposal and the Deans approved, the proposal 
status will change to the ready for Research Administrator’s approval 
else will remain ready for Dean approval. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status will change to 
not submitted. 
Extension Points 1. Step 6, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative Flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
  2.a.1 The actor opens check the notification tab. 
  2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal. 
The use case continuous at The actor approves/disapproves the 
proposal in MF. 
Exception Flow NONE. 




B.1.16 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Administrator Use Case 
Description 
Table 53: Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Administrator Use 
Case. 
Use case # UC-16 
Use case name Approve/Disapprove a proposal by Research Administrator. 
Actor The Research Administrator. 
Goal To approve/disapprove the proposal.  
Preconditions 1- The proposal status is ready for Research Administrator. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note 
fields. 
4. The actor can update the following sections of the proposal, such as 
“Investigator Information”, “Project Information”, Sponsor and Budget 
Information”, “Cost share Information”, “UniversityCommitments”, 
“Conflict of Interest and Commitment Information”,” Compliance 
Information”, “Additional Information”, “Collaboration Information”, 
“Proprietary/Confidential Information”, “Certification/Signatures”, and 
“OSP Section”. 
5. The actor approves or disapproves the proposal. 
6. If the actor approves the proposal, the system will send notifications to 
the PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel and University Research Director, Else, 
the system will send a notification to PI, Co-PI, Senior Personnel, 
Department Chair, Business Manager, Dean, University Research 
Administrator, University Research Director and IRB. 
7. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
8. The system sends a confirmation message. 
9. The system records that on the user audit log. 
10. The system records in the system log.  
Post-Condition 
1. If the actor approved the proposal, the proposal status changed to ready 
for Research Director approval. 
2. If the actor disapproves the proposal, the proposal status changed to not 
submitted, and, clear all signatures.  
Extension Points 1. Step 6, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
  2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
  2. a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at 
The actor approve/disapprove the proposal in MF.  







B.1.17 GPMS User Login Use Case Description 
Table 54: GPMS Login User Use Case. 
Use case # UC-17 
Use case name User Login. 
Actor User/ Admin. 
Goal To login to the system. 
Preconditions 1.  The actor has an account. 
Main Flow 
1.  The actor selects the login page. 
2.  The system redirects to the login page. 
3.  The actor fills in the Email/Username field.  
4.  The actor fills in the Password field. 
5.  The actor selects the “Login” action. 
6.  The system redirects to actor’s account page. 
7.  The system records that on the user audit log. 
8.  The system records in the system log.  
Post-Condition 
1. The actor successfully logs into the system. 
2. The system redirects the user to the user home page. 
Extension Points NONE 
Alternative flow NONE. 
Exception flow NONE. 
Recovery flow NONE. 
 
B.1.18 Sign a Proposal by CO-PI Use Case Description 
Table 55: Sign a Proposal by CO-PI Use Case. 
Use case # UC-18 
Use case name CO-PI signs a proposal. 
Actor CO-PI. 
Goal CO-PI signs the proposal. 
Preconditions 1.  The CO-PI is added to the proposal by PI. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to his/her account. 
2. The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
3. The actor can update “Investigator Information” section in the proposal. 




5. The system updates the proposal status and saves it. 
6. The system sends a confirmation message. 
7. The send notification to the PIs and CO_PIs 
8. The system records that on the user audit log. 
9. The system records in the system log. 
Post-Condition 1.  The proposal status changed to ready to submit by PI. 
Extension Points 2. Step 7, Notify Users use case. 
Alternative flow 
2.a The actor uses the notification tab to select the proposal 
2.a.1 The actor selects check the notification tab 
 2.a.2 The actor selects the proposal. The use case continuous at The 
actor signs the proposal in MF. 
Exception flow NONE. 
Recovery flow NONE. 
 
B.1.19 Notify Users Use Case Description 
Table 56: Notify Users Use Case 
Use case # UC-19 
Use case name Notify Users  
Actor System 
Goal To notify users about the proposal document updates 
Preconditions 1. A Proposal document changed to another status  
Main Flow 1. The actor modifies to a proposal document. 
2. The system receives the new proposal document changes. 
3. The system sends notifications to the users according to on the 
notification policy. 
Post-Condition 1. The actors receive the notification of the latest updates of a 
proposal document. 
Extension Points NONE 
Alternative flow NONE 
Exception flow NONE 








B.2 GPMS Misuse Cases 
B.2.1 URL Redirection Misuse Case Description 
Table 57: URL Redirection Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-1 
Misuse case name URL Redirection. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To redirect the user to other website and steal user information.  
Actor System, adversary. 
Preconditions 2. The system is up and running. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens/creates a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The system will redirect the user to the malicious site. 
Threat point 
2. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
4. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
5. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
6. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
8. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
9. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields.  






B.2.2 Disable Edit a Proposal Document Action Misuse Case Description 
Table 58: Disable Edit a Proposal Action Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-2 
Misuse case name Disable edit proposal document action. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To prevent the user from accessing to the proposal document. 
Actor Adversary, system 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens/creates a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the save, submit, approve or disapprove proposal 
actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The actor cannot open the proposal document. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 






B.2.3 Disable a Proposal Save Action Misuse Case Misuse Case Description 
Table 59: Disable a Proposal Save Action Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-3 
Misuse case name Disable Save proposal action. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To prevent save the proposal. 
Actor Adversary 
Preconditions 
1. The actor has an account on the system or has other user login 
information. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens/creates a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The user cannot save the proposal. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields.  






B.2.4 Disable Approve /Disapprove Actions Misuse Case Description 
Table 60: Disable Approve/Disapprove Actions Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-4 
Misuse case name Disable Approve/Disapprove proposal actions. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To prevent approve/disapprove the proposal. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens/creates a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The user cannot approve/disapprove the proposal. 
Threat point 1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 






B.2.5 Display/Print out User ID Misuse Case Description 
Table 61: Display/Print out User ID Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-5 
Misuse case name Display user ID attack. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To display user ID. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The used system ID printout on the signature section. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 






B.2.6 Destroy a Proposal Document Web Page Misuse Case Description 
Table 62: Destroy a Proposal Document Web Page Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-6 
Misuse case name Destroy the proposal document. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To prevent save the proposal. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. To destroy content of the proposal document 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The proposal document layout destroyed. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
  






B.2.7 Access to Admin Site Misuse Case Description 
Table 63: Access to Admin Site Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-7 
Misuse case name Access to the system admin account. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To access the admin site. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. Access to the admin site. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 







B.2.8 Disable Proposals View List Misuse Case Description 
Table 64: Disable Proposals View List Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-8 
Misuse case name Hide/disable all proposal attack misuse cases 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To display user ID. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The legitimate user proposal cannot be displayed. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 







B.2.9 Unauthorized Update Proposal Fields Misuse Case Description 
Table 65: Unauthorized Update Proposal Fields Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-9 
Misuse case name Unauthorized proposal updates section fields. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To update proposal without permission validation 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor is signed into the system. 
2. The actor selects “My Proposals” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4. The actor updates non-editable sections fields by executing javascript 
code. 
5. The actor selects Approve, Disapprove or submits action. 
Post-conditions 1.  The updated section fields successfully updated and saved. 
Threat point 
1. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
3. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
4. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
5. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
7. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 








B.2.10 Disable All Proposal Actions Misuse Case Description 
Table 66: Disable All Proposal Actions Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-11 
Misuse case name Disable all proposal actions 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To disable the actions of proposal document 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The user cannot use any action from the proposal document. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 






B.2.11 Disable Submit Proposal Action Misuse Case Description 
Table 67: Disable Submit Proposal Action Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-11 
Misuse case name Disable “Submit” proposal actions. 
Misuse case 
category 
Information Disclosure, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To prevent the proposal submission. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The actor selects my proposal action. 
3. The actor opens a proposal document by select edit action. 
4. The actor injects the malicious code in the signature field. 
5. The actor selects one of the saves, submit, approve or disapprove 
proposal actions according to the user privilege and proposal phase. 
Post-conditions 1. The user cannot submit the proposal. 
Threat point 
1. Create/add a proposal, Main flow, Step 14, the actor fills the 
“Certification/Signatures” section by filling: “Signature(s), Date and 
Note” fields. 
2. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Dean, Main flow, step 3, The actor sign 
the proposal. 
3. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 4, 
The actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” 
fields. 
4. Submit the proposal by Research Administrator, Main flow, Step 3, The 
actor sign the proposal by filling: “Signature(s), Date and Note” fields 
5. Department Chair approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
6. Business Manager approves/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 5, 
The actor signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
7. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Administrator, Main Flow, 
Step 3, The actor selects the proposal by selecting edit action. 
8. IRB approve/disapprove the proposal, Main Flow, Step 4, The actor 
signs the proposal by filling the signature, date, and note fields. 
 






B.2.12 Access to Admin Account by Using Signup Action Misuse Case Description 
Table 68: Access to Admin Account by Using Signup Action Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-12 
Misuse case name Access to Admin Accounts by Using Signup Action 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and Elevation of privilege. 
Goal To access the admin site 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The actor has account on the system or has other user login information 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page. 
5. The access to the Admin Account. 
Post-conditions 1. Access the admin dashboard. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action. 
Mitigation Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
B.2.13 Unauthorized Delete User Account Misuse Case Description 
Table 69: Unauthorized Delete User Account Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-13 
Misuse case name Unauthorized delete user account 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To delete system users accounts. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page. 
5. The access to the Admin Account. 
Post-conditions 1. To access the admin site. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action. 




B.2.14 Unauthorized Activate/Deactivate User Accounts Misuse Case Description 
Table 70: Unauthorized Activate/Deactivate User Accounts Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-14 
Misuse case name Unauthorized activate/deactivate user accounts. 
Misuse case category Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To activate/deactivate user accounts. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page. 
5. The actor activates/deactivate users. 
Post-conditions 1. The user account activated/deactivated. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The 
actor fills the required fields and selects sign up action. 
Mitigation Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
B.2.15 Unauthorized Modification of User Proposals Misuse Case Description 
Table 71: Unauthorized Modification Users Proposal Misuse Case 
Misuse case # MUC-15 
Misuse case name Unauthorized Modification Users Proposal fields. 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, Privilege Elevation and information disclosure. 
Goal To update proposal without permission validation 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page 
5. The actor modifies user’s proposals. 
Post-conditions 1. The user proposals updated successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor 
fills the required fields and selects sign up action. 
Mitigation 





B.2.16 Unauthorized Delete User Proposals Misuse Case Description 
Table 72: Unauthorized Delete User Proposals Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-16 
Misuse case name Unauthorized delete user proposals 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To delete user proposals 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page 
5. The actor deletes user proposal document. 
Post-conditions 1. The user account Activate/deactivate. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action. 
Mitigation Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
B.2.17 Unauthorized Modifying User Accounts Misuse Case Description 
Table 73: Unauthorized Modifying User Accounts Information Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-17 
Misuse case name Unauthorized Modifying User Accounts Information. 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To modifying user accounts information 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page 
5. The actor modifies user’s information. 
Post-conditions 1. The user account information updated successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action. 




B.2.18 Unauthorized Delete All Users Accounts Misuse Case Description 
Table 74: Unauthorized Delete All Users Accounts Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-18 
Misuse case name Unauthorized delete All User Accounts. 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To delete all user accounts 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page 
5. The actor deletes all system user’s actions. 
Post-conditions 1. The user's accounts deleted successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action.  
Mitigation Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
 
B.2.19 Unauthorized Delete All Proposals Misuse Case Description 
Table 75: Unauthorized Delete All Proposals Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-19 
Misuse case name Unauthorized delete all user’s proposals documents 
Misuse case 
category 
Spoofing, DoS and elevation of privilege. 
Goal To delete all user proposals document. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor selects signup page. 
2. The actor injects crafted malicious code in the username field. 
3. The actor selects signup action. 
4. The actor selects the link of the system admin web page. 
5. The actor deletes all proposal documents. 
Post-conditions 1. The all user proposal deleted successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Create User account/ signup new user, Main Flow, Step 3, The actor fills 
the required fields and selects sign up action.  




B.2.20 Unauthorized Download File Misuse Case Description 
Table 76: Unauthorized Download File Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-20 
Misuse case name Unauthorized download files. 
Misuse case 
category 
DoS, Information Disclosure 
Goal To download proposals document files. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor craft the HTTP header request by adding the name of the file 
to be downloaded. 
2. The actor sends the HTTP request to the system to download the file. 
Post-conditions 1. The file downloaded successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Add/Create a proposal, Main Flow, Step 15, The actor fills “Appendices” 
section by using the upload file action. 
Mitigation Prevent file path injection mitigation use case 
 
B.2.21 Upload Dangerous Contents Misuse Case Description 
Table 77: Upload Dangerous Contents to the System Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-21 




Goal To upload malicious files. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The select the “My Proposals” actions. 
3. The actor opens proposal document by selecting edit proposal action 
4. The actor selects the “Appendices” section  
5. The actor uploads the malicious file by selecting the upload action. 
6. The actor selects the save action. 
Post-conditions 1. The file uploaded successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Add/Create a proposal, Main Flow, Step 15, The actor fills “Appendices” 
section by using the upload file action.  





B.2.22 Upload Large Files DoS Misuse Case Description 
Table 78: Upload Large Files DoS Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-22 
Misuse case 
name 
Upload large files to the system  
Misuse case 
category 
Denial of service (DoS). 
Goal To upload large files that consume the I/O disk space. 
Actor Adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The select the “My Proposals” actions. 
3. The actor opens proposal document by selecting edit proposal action 
4. The actor selects the “Appendices” section  
5. The actor uploads the large file by selecting the upload action. 
6. The actor selects the save action. 
Post-conditions 1. The file uploaded successfully. 
Threat point 
1. Add/Create a proposal, Main Flow, Step 15, The actor fills “Appendices” 
section by using the upload file action.  
Mitigation Limiting the uploading file size per user mitigation use case. 
 
B.2.23 Overwrite Uploaded Files Misuse Case Description 
Table 79: Overwrite Uploaded Files Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-23 
Misuse case name Overwrite uploaded files. 
Misuse case 
category 
Denial of service (DoS). 
Goal To overwrite uploaded files with other files 
Actors Adversary. 
Preconditions 
1. The proposal status is not submitted by PI. 
2. The actor upload files with the same name of the files that already 
uploaded. 
3. The actor has access to the system. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor login to the system. 
2. The select the “My Proposals” actions. 
3. The actor opens proposal document by selecting edit proposal action 
4. The actor selects the “Appendices” section  
5. The actor uploads the already exists file by selecting the upload action. 
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6. The actor selects the save action. 
Post-conditions 
1. The file being uploaded, uploaded to the system and overwrite the 
existence one. 
Threat point 
1. Add/Create a proposal, Main Flow, Step 15, The actor fills “Appendices” 
section by using the upload file action. 
Mitigation Rename uploaded file to the system mitigation use case 
 
B.2.24 Automatic Users Registration Misuse Case Description 
Table 80: Automatic Users Registration Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-24 
Misuse case name Automatic register user accounts 
Misuse case 
category 
Tempering, Denial of service attack (DoS). 
Goal 
To automatically create malicious user accounts and/or crash the 
service.  
Actor System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The system is up and running. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor access to the system login page. 
2. The actor automatically and repeatedly does: 
2.1 The actor selects the SingUp page link. 
2.2 The actor fills the required fields. 
2.3 The actor selects SignUp action. 
Post-conditions 
1. Create malicious users accounts. 
2. The signup process will be suspended or crashed. 
Threat point 
1. Create user account, Main flow, Step 4, The system receives the signup 
request.  
Mitigation Honey Token Form component mitigation use case 
 
B.2.25 Username Harvesting Misuse Case Misuse Case Description 
Table 81: Username Harvesting Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-25 




Goal To validate the correctness of the username 
Actors System, adversary. 




1. The actor access to the login page. 
2. The actor inserts the username and wrong password. 
3. The actor validates the error message that issued by the system. 
Post-conditions 1.  Validate the correctness of the username. 
Threat point 1. Login, Main Flow, Step2, User insert the username and password. 
Mitigation 
Prevent harvesting the username and/or password mitigation use 
case. 
 
B.2.26 Unauthorized Proposal Approve/Disapprove by CO-PI Misuse Case Description 
Table 82: Unauthorized proposal approve/ disapprove by CO-PI Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-26 
Misuse case name Unauthorized proposal approve/ disapprove by CO-PI. 
Misuse case 
category 
Privilege elevation attack, DoS. 
Goal To approve/disapprove the proposal without permission validation. 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal is ready for CO-PI submission. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor is signed in as CO-PI. 
2. The actor selects “My Proposal” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4. The actor signs the proposal. 
5. The actor selects “Approve” action 
Post-conditions 1. The Proposal status changed to be approved by CO_PI. 
Threat point 
1. Submit proposal by CO_PI, Main flow, Step 5, The actor submits the 
proposal. 
Mitigation 
Server side trusted data for driving access control decisions 
mitigation use case. 
 
B.2.27 Unauthorized Submission by Research Director Misuse Case Description 
Table 83: Unauthorized a Proposal Submission by Research Director Misuse 
Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-27 
Misuse 
case name 





Privilege elevation, DoS. 
Goal To submit a proposal without authorization. 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1.  The proposal status is waiting for research director approval. 
Main Flow 
1- The actor is signed in as Research Director. 
2- The actor selects “My Proposals” action. 
3- The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4- The actor signs the proposal.  
5- The actor selects “submit” section. 
Post-conditions 1- The proposal status changed to be submitted by research director. 
Threat point 
1. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Research Director, Main flow, Step 5, 
The actor approve or disapprove the proposal by selecting 
approve/disapprove action. 
Mitigation 
Server side trusted data for driving access control decisions 
mitigation 
 
B.2.28 Unauthorized Archive a Proposal by Business Manager Misuse Case Description 
Table 84: Unauthorized Archive a Proposal by BM Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-28 
Misuse case name Unauthorized archive a proposal by BM. 
Misuse case category Privilege elevation, DoS 
Goal To archive proposal without authorization. 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal status is ready for BM approval. 
Main Flow 
1. The actor is signed in as BM. 
2. The actor selects “My Proposals” action. 
3. The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4. The actor signs the proposal. 
5. The actor selects “archive” action. 
Post-conditions 1.  The proposal status changed to be archive by BM. 
Threat point 
1. Approve/disapprove a proposal by BM, Main flow, Step 5, The 
actor selects the approve/disapprove action. 
Mitigation 







B.2.29 Unauthorized Delete a Proposal by Department Chair Misuse Case Description 
Table 85: Unauthorized Delete a Proposal by Dept. Chair Misuse Case. 
Misuse case # MUC-29 
Misuse case name Unauthorized Delete of a proposal by department Chair. 
Misuse case category Privilege elevation attack, DoS. 
Goal To delete proposal without authorization. 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal status is waiting for Chair’s approval. 
Main Flow 
1- The actor is signed in as Chair. 
2- The actor selects “My Proposals” action. 
3- The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4- The actor signs the proposal. 
5- The actor selects “Delete” action. 
Post-conditions 
1- The proposal status changed to be deleted. 
2- The proposal document cannot be submitted by PI one more time. 
Threat point 
1. Approve/Disapprove proposal by Department Chair, Main flow, 
Step 5, The actor approve or disapprove the proposal by selecting 
approve/disapprove action. 
Mitigation 
Server side trusted data for driving access control decisions 
mitigation. 
 
B.2.30 Unauthorized Withdraw a Proposal by PI Misuse Case Description 
Table 86: Unauthorized Withdraw a Proposal by PI Misuse Case 
Misuse case # MUC-30 
Misuse case name Unauthorized withdraw of a proposal by PI. 
Misuse case category Privilege elevation attack, DoS. 
Goal To submit a proposal without authorization. 
Actors System, adversary. 
Preconditions 1. The proposal status is waiting for research director approval. 
Main Flow 
1.  The actor is signed in as PI. 
2.  The actor selects “My Proposals” action. 
3.  The actor selects the proposal by selecting “Edit” action. 
4.  The actor signs the proposal.  
5.  The actor selects “withdraw” section. 
Post-conditions 1.  The proposal status changed to be withdrawn by PI. 
Threat point 





Server side trusted data for driving access control decisions 
mitigation. 
 
B.3 GPMS Mitigation Use Cases  
B.3.1 Cross-Site Scripting Attack Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 87: Cross-Site Scripting Attack Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 1 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) prevention. 
Goal To prevent the XSS attack 
Precondition 
1. The actor injects malicious script code. 
2. The actor uploads malicious script code.  
Main Flow 
1. Validate user input by using whitelist technique. 
2. Use Output Escaping technique to ensure any JavaScript code is 
converted to safe display. 
3. Use HTML escape JSON values and decode the JSON values and 
safely parse it. 
Post Condition 
1. The XSS attack malicious code will not be executed. 
2. The application will render the web pages safely and appropriately. 
3. The application protects the user data.  
Priority High 
 
B.3.2 Validate File Extension and Content Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 88: Validate File Extension and Content Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 2 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Validating file extensions and contents.  
Goal To prevent uploading dangerous files to the system.  
Precondition 1. The actor upload files to the system. 
Main Flow 
1. Validate the uploading file extension by using whitelist technique. 
2. Validate the contents of the uploaded file by using antivirus. 
Post Condition 
1. The application prevents uploading files with a malicious extension 
such as. JSP. 
2. The application prevents uploading files with malicious contents with 





B.3.3 Limiting the Uploading File Size Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 89: Limiting the Uploading File Size Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # 
MITI-UC 3 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Limiting the uploading file size per user. 
Goal To prevent uploading large file size to the system.  
Precondition 1. The actor upload files to the system. 
Main Flow 
1. Validating the file size with the available system disk space. 
2. Compare the file size with remaining disk space for the user. 
3. Validate the number of uploading files for the user. 
 
Post Condition 
1. Prevent the actor from an uploading large number of files. 





B.3.4 Rename Uploaded File to the System Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 90: Rename Uploaded File to the System Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case 
# 
MITI-UC 4 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Rename uploaded files. 
Goal To prevent files, overwrite attack. 
Precondition 1. The actor uploads the file to the system. 
Main Flow 
1. Use random function to generate new file name 
2. Concatenate the generated random name with characters.  
3. Rename the file being uploaded with new random name. 
Post Condition 1. The uploaded file has the new random name.  
Priority Medium 
 
B.3.5 Prevent File Path Injection Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 91: Prevent File Path Injection Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 5 
Mitigation use case 
name 




To prevent read resources inside and outside the web application 
folder. 
Precondition 1. The actor injects malicious parameter in the request header.  
Main Flow 
1. Probably canonical and validating any given file path. 
2. Validate the user session if it still alive or not. 
3. Validate the user permission before accessing to any resource. 
4. Use the minimum privilege for accessing the resources.   
Post Condition 
1. Prevent accessing to the system resources. 
2. Prevent downloading resource without user validation.  
Priority High 
 
B.3.6 Honey Token Form Component Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 92: Honey Token Form Component Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 6 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Honeytoken form component. 
Goal To prevent automatic user registration. 
Precondition 1. The actor executes automatic user registration script.  
Main Flow 
1. Add a field to the user sign up sensitive form. 
2. Hide this field with CSS and make it invisible to the normal users and 
visible to the automation registration scripts. 
3.  The value of the hidden file will empty for the normal registration 
and non-empty for the automatic one. 
4. Validate the hidden field value for each sign-up request on the server 
side. 
5. Throw a message if the field values not empty and stop the sign up 
the process.  
Post Condition 
1. Discover the automatic registration request from normal ones. 
2. Prevent the automatic registration request. 
Priority High. 
 
B.3.7 Prevent Harvesting the Username Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 93: Prevent Harvesting The Username Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 7 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Prevent username and/or password harvesting 
Goal 




Precondition The actor keeps using different username or password  
Main Flow 
1. The validate the username and password for each login request. 
2. The system throws the same error message in both cases if the 
username or password are incorrect. 
Post Condition 




B.3.8 Server side for Driving ACL Mitigation Use Case Description 
Table 94: Server Side Trusted Data for Driving ACL Mitigation Use Case. 
Mitigation use case # MITI-UC 8 
Mitigation use case 
name 
Server side trusted to drive access control decision. 
Goal 
To prevent using client request data to make access control 
decision.  
Precondition 
1. The actor updates unauthorized proposal section. 
2. The actor requests unauthorized proposal actions. 
3. The actor requests modifying and accessing to unauthorized 
application resources.  
Main Flow 
1. Using trusted session to verify and retrieve user identity. 
2. Using server side trusted resources to retrieve the policy information 
and user’s roles. 
3. Validate the updated proposal sections data and requested actions 
based on access control decisions and uses roles. 
4. Reject saving the updated proposal document that violates the user 
permission. 
Post Condition 
1. The application prevents accessing to unauthorized resources. 
2. The application prevents unauthorized proposal data. 










B.4 GPMS Security Test Models Based on Use Case Technique  
B.4.1 Create a New Proposal Document by PI Security Test Model 
 














B.4.2 Submit a Proposal by PI Security Test Model 
 
 
Figure 45: Submit a Proposal by PI Security Test Model. 




Figure 46: Sign a Proposal by CO-PI Security Test Model. 
B.4.4 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Department Chair Security Test Model 
 














B.4.5 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Admin Security Test Model 
 
Figure 48: Approve by Approve/Disapprove Admin Security Test Model. 
B.4.6 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by IRB Security Test Model 
 
 
Figure 49: Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by IRB Security Test Model. 
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B.4.7 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Research Director Security Test Model 
 
Figure 50: Approve/Disapprove by Research Director Security Test Model. 
B.4.8 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Dean Security Test Model 
 
 
Figure 51: Approve/Disapprove by Dean Security Test Model. 
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B.4.9 Approve/Disapprove a Proposal by Business Manager Security Test Model 
 
Figure 52: Approve/Disapprove by Business Manager Security Test Model. 
B.4.10 Signup New User Attack Security Test Model 
 
Figure 53: Signup New User Attack Security Test Model. 
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B.4.11 Submit a Proposal by Research Admin Security Test Model 
 
Figure 54: Submit a Proposal by Research Admin Security Test Model. 
 
B.4.12 Withdraw a Proposal by Research Admin Security Test Model 
 
Figure 55: Withdraw a Proposal by Research Admin Security Test Model. 
157 
 
B.4.13 Login Use Case Harvest Attack Security Test Model 
 
















B.5 GPMS Security Test Models Based on STRIDE Technique  
B.5.1 Denial of Service, Information Disclosure, and Privilege Elevation Security Test 
Model 
 
Figure 57: Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Privilege Elevation 
Categories Security Test Model. 
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B.5.2 Spoofing, Privilege Elevation and Denial of Service Security Test Model 
 
Figure 58: Privilege Elevation and Denial of Service Security Test Model 
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B.5.3 Denial of Service Category Security Test Model 
 
Figure 59: Denial of Service Category Security Test Model. 
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B.5.4 Denial of Service and Tampering Categories Security Test Model 
 
Figure 60: Denial of Service/Tampering Categories Security Test Model. 
